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During the last decade, constitutional theory has been radically
altered by the infusion of ideas loosely grouped under the title
"civic republicanism."
Recent attention to these ideas initially
surfaced during the sixties and seventies in the works of legal
historians who argued that the founders of the American constitutional scheme were influenced as much by republican ideas as by
traditional Lockean liberal theory.'
In the last decade, civic
republican theory has become the primary concern of several
prominent constitutional scholars. Nationally known scholars such
as Frank Michelman, Cass Sunstein, and Mark Tushnet have written
2
extensively of their desire for a more "republican" Constitution.
This article examines several different aspects of the civic
republican phenomenon. The first aspect involves the constitution-

al politics of civic republicanism. In particular, why are politically
left-of-center constitutional scholars attracted to civic republicanism?

Putting the matter differently, is civic republican theory truly
congenial to the goals and aspirations of constitutional theorists
who locate themselves on the left side of the political spectrum?
The most obvious answer to these questions is that the political left
shares with civic republican theory a theoretical focus on the

See, e.g., JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER:

THE

REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s, at 17 (1984) (arguing that "[a]lthough classical
republicanism offered the possibility of establishing an enduring republic where men
might enjoy the liberty of civic participation, the theory itself was grounded in an
historical realism that cautioned against having too high hopes, given the fickle,
power-lusting nature of men"); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE

AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23 (1967) (noting that a '[s]tudy of the sources of the
colonists' thought as expressed in the informal as well as the formal documents...
reveals ... a massive, seemingly random eclecticism"); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC

REPUBLICAN TRADITION 506 (1975) (noting that "[i]t is now possible to explore the
history of American consciousness in search of what manifestations of the problems
of the republican perspective may be found there"); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-87, at 467 (1969) (discussing the

influences of republican ideals on public desire for general reform).
2 See e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (1988) (noting that "[t]he republican tradition, though quite
different from liberalism in its origins and intentions, offered solutions to the related
problems of potential legislative tyranny, potential paralysis, and potential judicial
tyranny"); Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1495 (1988)
(advocating republican constitutionalism, which "involves the ongoing revision of the
normative histories that make political communities sources of contestable value and
self-direction for their members"); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the RepublicanRevival, 97
YALE LJ. 1539, 1576-89 (1988) (describing the impact of republicanism upon several
modern public law controversies and suggesting that an understanding of republicanism requires a reformation of legal rules).
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community rather than the individual. Both civic republicans and
members of the political left view the collective exercise of power
more favorably than their political and theoretical adversaries.
Under this view, both civic republicans and members of the political
left view government as the necessary agent for cultivating positive
social values and developing a "good" society. Classical liberal
theory and members of the political right, on the other hand, view
government as at best an unfortunate necessity.
This explanation of the natural attraction between the left and
civic republicanism has one major problem: the left's traditional
support for civil liberties is incompatible in certain respects with
civic republican theory. This is the second aspect of the civic
republican phenomenon addressed in this article. The essence of
the problem is this: if collective political decisions are favored-and
if the government is the logical agent to implement the "good"
society-then there is no reason for the government not to extend
its power to make collective determinations into those areas
traditionally protected as fundamental individual liberties. This has
been a common reaction to republican theory, and several republican theorists have attempted to respond by reintroducing elements
of liberalism or "practical reason " ' into their civic republican
theories.
The first two sections of the article discuss the fundamentals of
civic republican theory and the mechanisms it provides for making
and enforcing political decisions. The third section of the article
addresses the problem of individual liberty and the republican
response. My conclusion is that the communitarian and collectivist
premises of civic republican theory logically require the theory's
adherents to abandon many traditional protections of civil liberties.
Indeed, it is also my conclusion that despite recent civic republican
overtures to the modern liberal sensibility, most civic republicans
actively desire the collectivization of civil liberties.
The final section of the article addresses the central theme
underlying all discussions of civic republican theory: the relationship between collectivism and individualism in the American
constitutional structure. This section will relate civic republican
3 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1566-71 (arguing in favor of "liberal republican-

ism").
4 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-18 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985).

804

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 141:801

theory to a broader understanding of modern democratic theory.
Both modern civic republican theory and traditional liberal theory
purport to be subsets of democratic theory. In other words, they
are both methods of effectuating the core democratic ideal that a
particular society's citizens be permitted to govern themselves. A
corollary of this basic principle of self-determination is that no
group of citizens can take command of the government forever. In
other words, any valid democratic theory must recognize that
governmental change is inevitable, and democratic governments
should therefore be structured in a way that permits the inevitable
change to occur.
I argue in the final section that modern civic republicans are
insufficiently sensitive to the democratic mandate of constant
change and flux. I believe that this flaw in modern civic republicanism is attributable to the fact that modern civic republicans view the
world from the perspective of political winners. Thus, they do not
sufficiently take account of what I call "losers' principles," some
form of which every proper democratic theory must incorporate.
The final section includes a discussion of three losers' principles
that seem incompatible with the most prominent modern versions
of civic republicanism. I conclude that by rejecting these "losers'
principles," civic republicanism ceases to be a truly democratic
theory. I also argue that to the extent modern civic republicanism
permits collective political power to override these losers' principles,
the theory also becomes an essentially conservative doctrine-a
notable irony given the political predilections of most civic
republican proponents. If these criticisms are correct, the article
concludes that it may be time to bury the new, improved versions
of civic republicanism alongside their classical predecessor.
I. THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF MODERN CIVIC REPUBLICANISM

At first glance, even defining-much less critiquing-civic
republicanism seems a risky enterprise. The most immediate
problem is that the classical tradition of civic republicanism contains
a number of elements that modern proponents of civic republicanism almost uniformly disavow. 5 Professor Tushnet is certainly

5 For example, modern civic republicans reject the classical civic republican
mandate that the franchise be restricted to the financially independent. See, e.g., Mark
Tushnet, The Conceptof Tradition in ConstitutionalHistoriography,29 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 93, 97 (1987) (noting that "[c]ontemporary admirers of republicanism obviously
do not defend the reimposition of franchise restrictions... [but] believe instead that
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correct to express reservations about attempts to revive a tradition
that is, in several important respects, irretrievable. 6 Nevertheless,
there are a significant number of modern constitutional theoristsincluding Tushnet-who endeavor to update and reconstitute civic
republican theory and apply the updated version to contemporary
constitutional interpretation. This article focuses on these modern
versions of civic republican theory rather than their historical
antecedents.
Unfortunately, even if consideration of civic republicanism is
limited to the theory's modern variations, it is difficult to define the
doctrine. Modern civic republicans disagree among themselves
about basic issues, such as the identity of their historical predecessors 7 and the relationship of civic republicanism to traditional
liberalism.8 Also, favorable discussions of civic republican concepts
are frustratingly vague. Articles and books by proponents of civic
republicanism lend themselves to platitudes and generalities about
community, discourse, dialogue, and virtue-terms of uncertain
meaning. The premise of this article is that the generalities of civic
republicanism can be made concrete, and despite the amorphous
and sometimes contradictory nature of modern civic republican
theory, even the most idiosyncratic civic republicans adhere to
several fairly specific central principles about society, politics, and
the Constitution. This section will identify and discuss the central
republicanism can be revitalized by establishing the independence of all who are
currently enfranchised"). Professor Sunstein notes that modern civic republicans also
are wary about the heroic and militaristic overtones of classical civic republican
thought. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1564. Sunstein also disclaims the unsavory
hints of elitism and even misogyny in some forms of classical republican thought. Id.
at 1565.
6 See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 95.
7 Compare POCOCK, supra note 1, at 530-32 (arguing that republican themes were
largely the province of antifederalists who opposed the federal constitution) and
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 5 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing
antifederalism as "derived at least in some respects from classical republicanism") and
WOOD, supra note 1, at 485 (stating that "[t]he quarrel [between federalists and
antifederalists] was fundamentally one between aristocracy and democracy") with
APPLEBY, supra note 1, at 8-19 (emphasizing the influence of republican themes on
federalism) andJoyce Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirsand the Disinherited,
74 J. AM. HIST. 798, 801-03 (1987) (same) and Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1558-63
(same).
8 Compare TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 4-17 (contrasting liberal and republican
traditions) and Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American
ConstitutionalThought, 29 WM. & MARYL. REv. 57,63-69 (1987) (same) with Sunstein,
supra note 2, at 1566-71 (arguing against a liberal/republican dichotomy and in favor
of "liberal republicanism").
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principles that I believe characterize modern civic republican
thought.
Of course, the fact that the modern advocates of civic republicanism agree about broad principles does not mean that they agree
about the definition, scope, or application of those principles.
There are indeed significant disagreements about these issues
among civic republicans. I believe that these disagreements about
the details of civic republicanism reflect a more pervasive disquiet
about the theory than the proponents themselves acknowledge. I
will argue below that most of the disputes among civic republicans
concerning the details of the doctrine's central principles occur in
response to the perceived need to overcome significant flaws in the
principles themselves. In any event, this section focuses on the
principles about which substantial agreement among civic republicans exists.
The central principles of modern civic republicanism are
relatively easy to identify. In one sentence, civic republicans argue
that the constitution provides the framework for an organic
community composed of socially constructed individuals, who join
together in government to identify and pursue civic virtue. This
thumbnail definition contains the three salient characteristics of
civic republicanism discussed in this section: the goal of civic
virtue, the organic concept of community, and the notion that
individuals are socially constructed. I will deal with civic virtue first,
because this concept is both the theoretical core and the Achilles
heel of all modern variations of civic republican theory.
A. Civic Virtue
The concept of civic virtue is the leitmotif of all civic republican
theory. Indeed, both Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein call civic
virtue the "animating principle" of civic republicanism. 9 If not the
animating principle of every aspect of republican thought, civic
virtue is certainly the centerpiece of the republican conception of
government. According to republican theory, civic virtue is not
simply a secondary by-product of other, more practical governmental activities: "In the republican vision, a primary function of
government is to order values and to define virtue, and thereby
educate its citizenry to be virtuous." 10 Just as the civic republicans

9 Michelman, supra note 4, at 18; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 31.
IoSuzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the FeminineVoice in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
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view civic virtue as necessary for government, they also view
government as necessary for civic virtue. Under the republican
scheme of things, "prepolitical differences are an inadmissible basis
for resolution of political controversy."11 Whatever virtue a citizen
develops outside his or her political involvement should be left at
the door when that citizen enters the government's chambers, since
the republican theory of government "depend[s] on an expectation
that citizens should entirely abandon their private identities when
12
they come to politics."
For all its importance to the civic republican project, civic
republicans have yet to provide a clear definition of the term "civic
virtue." In part, this is due to the fact that civic republicans
maintain that no decontextualized, a priori definition of virtue is
possible. Virtue, the republicans argue, is defined by the political
process of dialogue and ultimate agreement over fundamental
collective goals and aspirations. In this, as in many other respects,
it is difficult to distinguish civic republicans from their theoretical
nemeses, the pluralists. 13 The pluralists also assert that no a priori
72 VA. L. REV. 543, 552 (1986).
11 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1564.
12 Id. The last two quotes refer to Professor Sunstein's description of classical
civic republican thought. To his credit, Professor Sunstein notes that these principles
are problematic, in part because expectations that different social groups put aside
their "private" identities and interests "hardly seems likely to lead to just outcomes.
Universalism ought not to be understood as a desire to obliterate social differences
in politics." Id. Nevertheless, the quote accurately reflects a mainstay of modern, as
well as classical republican thought: the need to subordinate individual desires and
interests to the greater collective good. The premise of this article is that the modern
civic republicans have neither cured the problems caused by this central aspect of
classical republican thought, nor have they modified the classical civic republican
reliance on universalism as much as they suppose.
i" My claim that civic republicans often fail adequately to distinguish themselves
from pluralists will undoubtedly raise the hackles of civic republicanism's proponents.
This claim will be explored in detail throughout this article, but I should make the
broad outline of my position clear at the outset. First, I do not claim that there is no
real difference between pluralism and civic republicanism. I believe the two theories
are indeed mutually exclusive in several important ways. I do claim that the
explanation and defense of civic republican ideas by the doctrine's modern
proponents often produce descriptions that can apply as easily to pluralist as to civic
republican theory. The reason for this, as I will argue throughout this article, is that
the proponents of civic republicanism often stop short of embracing the full measure
of political and social consequences required by civic republican theory. This
hesitancy causes many modern civic republican sympathizers to dilute their
explanations of civic republican ideas with pluralist concepts. I will argue in this
article that the modern advocates of civic republicanism should follow their instincts
a little farther. If they do, those instincts may lead them to abandon civic republicanism altogether.
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set of values defines society, urging instead that society is governed
by a constantly shifting set of agreements and deals cut by factions
14
within society competing for political power.
The key difference between the civic republican and pluralist
views of civic virtue seems to be that the civic republicans give a
great deal more significance than the pluralists to the ultimate
conclusion of the political process. Pluralists treat the conclusion
of the political process as nothing more than one of an infinite
number of transitory political judgments that reflect the changing
conditions and power relationships within society. To the pluralists,
"[t]he common good amounts to an aggregation of individual
preferences." 15 On the other hand, civic republicans argue that
the proposed republican dialogue among citizens (which is their
model for good government) 1 6 ultimately will produce a set of
definitive principles for society that will guide every other subsequent decision by the collective political body. 17 This republican
dialogue will also channel the thoughts, attitudes, and behavior of
every individual within society. In other words, the political
dialogue will produce-and then encourage and cultivate-civic
virtue.
Although the point is not commonly emphasized in civic
republican arguments, the political dialogue that produces civic
virtue will also identify the opposite of civic virtue. More ominously, just as a civic republican government must inculcate civic virtue
in its citizens,1 8 the civic republican view of government seems to
mandate that the government must discourage and even punish
civic vice. As Professor Sunstein has said, "on republican grounds
14 For a general discussion of pluralist political theory, see ROBERT A. DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY. AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (1982). For an
application of pluralist theory by the Supreme Court, see United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) ("[T]his Court has never insisted
that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. This is particularly
true where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing....
[T]he fact the line might have been drawn differently.., is a matter for legislative,
rather thanjudicial, consideration."). For a discussion of pluralism and competing
theories in the American constitutional tradition, see Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013, 1013-31 (1984).
15 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32-33.
Is See infra notes 103-33 and accompanying text (discussing civic republican theory
on the proper working of the political process).
17 See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing the civic republican
framework for reconciling various interests in the political process).
18 Or, in a more benign formulation, a republican government will "educate its
citizenry to be virtuous." Sherry, supra note 10, at 552.
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it is unclear that 'neutrality' among competing conceptions of the
good life is always desirable even if it were possible for governmenthis mandate
tal institutions to achieve it." 19 The implications
20
carries for civil liberties will be explored below.
The civic republican renouncement of neutrality regarding
"competing conceptions of the good life" suggests that civic
republicans view the notion of civic virtue as an essentialist concept.
In other words, if civic republicans believe that the set of values
labeled "civic virtue" is inherently superior to other, contrary values,
they also must believe that civic virtue has an objective essence
beyond the process of ascertaining and defining those preferred
values. Under this interpretation, the properly constructed civic
republican government in effect discovers, rather than creates, civic
virtue through dialogue and deliberation.
My conclusion that civic virtue must have some essential
defining characteristics seems logically unavoidable within the civic
republican system. For one thing, if civic virtue is nothing more
than a temporary value judgment by transitory political actors, then
civic republicanism is indistinguishable from its supposed oppositepluralism. 21 Moreover, civic republicans regularly declare their
assurance that there is a palpable distinction between "good" and
"bad" social and political values. Professor Sunstein himself refers
to the civic republicans' "belief in universalism" and notes that
republicans "reject ethical relativism and skepticism." 22 He also
asserts that "[the republican] conception reflects a belief that debate
and discussion help to reveal that some values are superior to
others. Denying that decisions about values are merely matters of
taste, the republican view assumes that 'practical reason' can be
23
used to settle social issues."
The odd thing about civic republican theory is that despite the
essentialist (or, to use Sunstein's term, "universalist") nature of civic
virtue, the civic republican dialogue is seldom cast as a quest for the
"essence" of civic virtue. Rather, the stated intention of civic
republican theory is to draw citizens into a joint effort to define
their core values. Immediately after referring to the civic republi19 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1570.
20 See infra part III.
21 Sunstein seems to acknowledge this. "The pluralist conception treats the
republican notion of a separate common good as incoherent, potentially totalitarian,
or both." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32 (footnote omitted).
22 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
23Sunstein, supra note 4, at 31-32.
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can belief in universalism, Sunstein defines his version of universalism as "posit[ing] the existence of a common good, to be found at
24
the conclusion of a well-functioning deliberative process."
Sunstein, like most modern civic republicans, tries to hedge his bets
by moving in two directions at once. Civic virtue definitely exists,
but its existence can be confirmed only by the process of collective
definition.
The problem here is that civic republicans must deny the
allegation of essentialism if they are to preserve their main objective
of encouraging popular self-rule, defined as "selecting the values
that ought to control public and private life." 25 This is so because
if the essence of civic virtue exists apart from the process of
collective deliberation, self-rule becomes an expendable value. If
civic virtue has an objective essence, a benign dictator who is wellattuned to civic virtue legitimately could dispense with the inefficient system of republican deliberation and proceed directly to the
deliberation's inevitable conclusion.
If civic virtue is not an objective value, however, civic republicanism seems to fall right back into the clutches of pluralist theory. If
there is no objective meaning to civic virtue, then civic virtue can
mean anything a given political system wants it to mean. Without
some objective measure by which to judge the outcome of the
deliberative process, any collective political system could justify
itself as "republican" simply by referring to its conclusions as
virtuous. Civic republicans attempt to escape this logical cul-de-sac
by ascribing to certain kinds of collective action an almost mystical
significance. The argument seems to be that civic virtue exists only
as a result of certain kinds of collective action. If a self-governing
body of citizens carries out solemn deliberations in a particular way,
and conducts its deliberations with a certain selfless mindset, then
the product of those deliberations will be, by definition, "civic
virtue." The precise nature of this collective deliberation-cumsanctification is the subject of the next subsection.

24 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
25 STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 5.
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B. The Organic Community
Civic republicanism is by nature a collectivist political theory.
In other words, civic republicanism gives primary empirical and
ethical significance to collective, rather than individual human
endeavors. Civic republicans view collective endeavors as empirically more significant because the actions of a collective entity such as
the government define the way individuals think and behave. In the
civic republican scheme, individuals are "socially situated or
constituted,"2 6 and "the private sphere is constituted by public
decisions. "27 As Professor Sunstein notes, this is an uncontroversial descriptive insight into human behavior in the modern
world. 28 Even the most individualistic modern legal or political
theorist would not dispute that a person's views and attitudes are
shaped in large part by the person's experiences with other people,
political institutions, and the larger social context.
Civic republican theory, however, like the Kantian ethical system
that republican thought often resembles, 29 uses this descriptive
26 Michelman, supra note 4, at 27.
27 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1569.

28 Id.
29 Professor Michelman suggests several parallels between Kantian moral
philosophy and the notion of self-government, which Michelman views as central to
his version of civic republican thought. See Michelman, supra note 4, at 26-31 (stating
that "Kantianism implies republicanism"). I will not deal with these parallels
explicitly, except to note that both Kantian and civic republican theories display the
same tendency to conflate the individual's participation in "self-government" (to use
Michelman's description) with the individual's "duty to obey the law." The merger
of these two concepts can have oppressive consequences when an individual's
membership and participation in society is used by social theory to obligate the
individual to accept communal determinations of value and virtue. "Self-government"
is one thing when the person governing herself is on the winning side of collective
disputes. To the winner of a political battle, the duty to obey collective decisions
about key moral issues (i.e., "civic virtue") does not infringe upon that person's own
values or freedom. However, the view is very different from the perspective of the
loser in a political battle over first principles. To the loser, the obligation to accept
the collective determination of virtue threatens the most important aspect of
individual autonomy-which is, in turn, the only real guarantor of a proper
democratic system. See infra part IV and accompanying text.
Kant attempted to ameliorate the oppressive possibilities of his scheme by
distinguishing moral obligations from legal obligations, and insisting that human
governments will never do more than approximate morality in their legaljudgments.
But by insisting that morality shape politics, and by accepting the existence of an
objective human purpose, or telos, whose implementation is the ultimate purpose of
government, Kant and the civic republicans who follow his lead leave the door open
to misjudgments by leaders about the infallibility of their temporal decisions. Kant
himself was not immune to the tendency to give governments the right to enforce
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reality as the basis of the theory's broad prescription for political
and governmental action. 30 The civic republicans start with the
uncontroversial empirical observation that social interactions of
every sort mold individuals. They then surmise (also uncontroversially) that if social interactions are the key to individual personality,
individual values are merely a product of the social matrix in which
they are produced.3 1 In short, the collective social environment

their moral decisions even where nothing but the maintenance of an abstract moral
equilibrium is at stake. A good example of this tendency is the Kantian view that
criminal punishment is justified as the government's means of enforcing individual
obligation to universal moral laws. Kant even argues that on the last day of a society's
existence a murderer must be executed "so that everyone will duly receive what his
actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people
because they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment." IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE 102 (John Ladd trans., 1965). Political theoriesKantian as well as civic republican-that rely too heavily on collective goals such as
universal morality and "civic virtue" are problematic because a society operating
under such a hallowed celestial mandate will occasionally forget the limits of its own
earth-bound and imperfect judgments.
So Although my focus is on the narrow issues relating to the justification of
collective political action, the civic republicans-again like the Kantians-are also
vulnerable to the broader problems associated with what the philosophers call the "isought question." See generally THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION (W. D. Hudson ed., 1969).
The "is-ought question" is raised by metaethical theories-which I believe are implicit
in civic republicanism-that attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is." The main
problem with such theories, as David Hume put it, is that "the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 470 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896). The
British moral philosopher G. E. Moore used similar logic in arguing that moral
notions of "good" and "bad" contain essentially indefinable, non-natural properties.
According to Moore, attempts to derive an "ought" from an "is" are examples of"the
naturalistic fallacy," because such attempts treat non-natural properties as if they were
natural properties. See G. E. MOORE, ETHICS 146-55 (1903). A. J. Ayer took this
argument the next step, arguing that ethical statements, like statements about the
existence of God, lack cognitive value altogether. See ALFRED J. AYER, LANGUAGE,
TRUTH, AND LOGIC 112-13 (2d ed. 1952) (arguing that ethical judgments are "mere
expressions of feeling"). As will become evident below, my critique of the collective
value judgments made by civic republicans incorporates a version of each of these
criticisms of naturalistic metaethical theory generally.
31 "Under [a civic republican] regime, purely private preferences are understood
to be shaped by circumstances; they are social constructs." Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Interferenceswith PrivatePreferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1986). Professor
Michelman even suggests that values cannot be formed outside the social context:
[The republican view] of the human condition implies that self-cognition
and ensuing self-legislation must, to a like extent, be socially situated; norms
must be formed through public dialogue and expressed as public law.
Normative reason, it then seems, cannot be a solitary activity. Its exercise
requires knowledge, including self-knowledge, obtainable only by encounter
with different outlooks in public argument.
Michelman, supra note 4, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
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inevitably shapes the individuals residing within it.32 From these
simple empirical observations, civic republicans leap to the
normative conclusion that society should shape its citizens'
individual personalities intentionally, with precise goals in mind,
rather than permit individual personalities to be defined at random
through the complex intersection of many different social influences. After all, the argument goes, if the social shaping of the
individual is inevitable, we may as well take control of the process
to ensure that the shaping is done correctly. This series of
empirical and normative determinations produces the central theme
of civic republican thought: the government should act aggressively
to mold individuals in socially beneficial ways. This theme provides
an unassailable (and circular) justification for collective decisions
that affect individuals within the community: collective decisions
are correct because-and only because-they are made collectively.
Civic republicans are not shy about stating whether the
community or the individual should be in control of the ethical and
ideological universe. As Professor Sunstein says, "a democratic
government should sometimes take private preferences as an object
of regulation and control." 3 Professor Sherry contrasts the civic
republican view with liberal political theory's mandate that the
government take a nonintrusive and uncoercive stance toward its
citizens' individual ethical and political beliefs: "Where liberalism
finds the primary purpose of government to be promotion of the
diverse goods of its individual citizens, republicanism finds its
primary purpose to be definition of community values and creation
of the public and private virtue necessary for societal achievement
34
of those values."
Control of private preferences is especially important to the
republican scheme when these preferences take the form of political
principles contrary to those bundled together under the term "civic
virtue." According to Professor Sunstein, a proper republican
2 "Any view in which the true, primary interests of individuals are 'exogenous'

or prior to politics is unrepublican." Michelman, supra note 4, at 27. Sunstein's
discussion of this point refers to "the phenomenon of endogenous preferences." "By
this term I mean to indicate that [private] preferences are not fixed and stable, but
are instead adaptive to a wide range of factors-including the context in which the
preference is expressed, the existing legal rules, past consumption choices, and
culture in general." Cass R. Sunstein, Preferencesand Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3,
5 (1991).
33 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 13.

3 Sherry, supra note 10, at 551.
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government should "instill principles of virtue" in order to avoid the
dangers of factional infighting over political decisions.8 5 As noted
above, the civic republican scheme grants a community's decisions
ethical validity and political legitimacy based entirely on the fact
that the decisions were made collectively."6 Under such a scheme
the community becomes something more than the sum of its parts.
The community becomes an organic entity, which possesses an
ethical and political legitimacy entirely distinct from its components
(i.e., the individual citizens who live together within the communi37
ty).

1. Identifying the Relevant Community
The nature and composition of the community is obviously very
important, given the power civic republicans grant to the community to dictate its members' beliefs and actions. Like many of the
terms that recur frequently in modern civic republican literature,
however, the meaning civic republicans give to the term "community" is not always clear. Part of the problem is that modern civic
republicans have not altogether abandoned the archaic definition of
community used by classical civic republicanism. To the classical
civic republicans, the politically relevant community had very
precise and manageable boundaries. They favored small, tightly-knit
communities.3 8 There were good reasons for this aspect of
35 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32 (arguing that education and prevailing morality
are the best defenses against factionalism).
36 The only escape from this conclusion is for civic republicans to concede that
their theory is in some fashion essentialist. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying
text. If they concede this point, then the ethical validity and political legitimacy of
community decisions are premised on the fact that the community is merely
implementing universal truths discovered through collective discussion and
deliberation. But if civic republicanism is essentialist in this way, then the collectivist
elements of their thought become harder tojustify. In order tojustify the collectivist
slant of the theory, civic republicans would have to produce evidence that collective
entities are more adept than individuals at ascertaining universal truth. Such
evidence is obviously not forthcoming. And, as noted in the discussion of civic virtue
above, seesupra notes 9-25 and accompanying text, civic republican arguments are not
cast in the form of a search for essences. Therefore, we must assume that the
theory's proponents do not believe in the existence of a universal, objective truth.
In that case, the tautological proposition in the text must stand as the definitive
statement of civic republican political legitimacy: according to the civic republicans,
collective decisions about matters of social policy are superior to individual decisions
solely because they are made collectively.
31 For the classical civic republican view on this subject, see APPLEBY, supra note
1, at 16-19; WOOD, supra note 1, at 53-65.
38 For Sunstein's summary of the classical position, see Sunstein, supra note 2, at
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classical civic republican doctrine: "smaller groups are easier to
organize than larger ones, and groups concentrated in one location
are likely to develop ties of friendship and cooperation that further
ease the burdens of organizing in opposition to outside efforts at
39
control."
Unfortunately, these small, cloistered, homogeneous communities have become largely irrelevant to discussions of the political
theory that should govern the modern nation-state. It should be
said that the modern civic republicans recognize the impossibility
of replicating the old republican community. 40 But it should also
be said that modern civic republicans are still drawn to the old
republican model of town-meeting direct democracy. 4 1 This
explains the repeated references in modern civic republican
literature to "self-government" and "dialogue." Unfortunately, by
trying to recreate a modern version of the old model of direct
democracy, the modern civic republicans end up preserving the bad
things about the classical civic republican community-its conformism, inhospitality to dissent, and antidemocratic deference to some
unassailable collective ideal such as "civic virtue"-while failing to
recapture the old system's one real advantage-its homey, personal,
face-to-face means of identifying and achieving common goals.
Even if the modern civic republicans could overcome the
problems posed by the growth of the modern state 42 and expand
1555-56 (stating that homogeneity and "feelings of community" are essential for
encouraging citizen participation).
39 TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 106-07.
40 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 13-15, 314 (noting that traditional
republicanism has disappeared due to societal changes, including a mobile citizenry
and an increase in the use of judicial power); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1556
(describing the traditional, ideal republican community).
41 Professor Sunstein offers this thumbnail description of the classical civic
republican view of politics:
To the republicans, the role of politics was above all deliberative. Dialogue
and discussion among the citizenry were critical features in the governmental process. Political participation was not limited to voting or other simple
statements of preference. The ideal model for governance was the town
meeting, a metaphor that played an explicit role in the republican
understanding of politics.
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 31. Sunstein prefaces his description of the classical
position with an endorsement of its central precepts as applied to the modern world:
"The central commitments of the republican conception are far from anachronistic,
and in its belief in a deliberative conception of democracy, it provides a basis for
evaluating administrative and legislative action that has both powerful historical roots
and considerable contemporary appeal."Id.
42 These difficulties are reflections of the even more serious problems created by
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the operational definition of "community" to encompass the
geographic territory of the entire United States, they are then
confronted with the equally vexing problem of defining the
community's legitimate membership. For example, are aliens living
in the United States part of our civic republican political community?43
Should membership in the community (along with the
community's collective legal protections) extend to those living
outside the specified geographical area, but who are directly
affected by the community's actions? 44 Should membership be
extended to society's ideological curmudgeons, who refuse to
participate in collective deliberations, stand in resolute opposition
to the community's ethos, and renounce society's civic virtue at
every opportunity?45 Perhaps equally importantly, should everyone living within the geographic boundaries of the United States
participate fully in the political community's determination of every
issue, even though some issues obviously affect some parts of the
community much more than others?
The modern civic republicans do not grapple very well with the
problems posed by divergent interests within a particular community. The closest they come to addressing the problems posed by

the economic transformations resulting from industrial development. See Steven G.
Gey, The PoliticalEconomy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 69-77 (1989-90) (discussing the proper regulatory role of states under the
commerce clause given the shift from a decentralized economy to an economy
dominated by national markets and large-scale enterprise).
43 Current equal protection doctrine permits states to discriminate against aliens
by denying them voting rights and barring them from elective or important
nonelective offices where the officer would "participate directly in the formulation,
execution, or review of broad public policy [and] perform functions that go to the
heart of representative government." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
The alienage cases include the specific recognition that aliens are not part of the
American political community. "We recognize a State's interest in establishing its
own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those
who are within 'the basic conception of a political community.'" Id. at 642 (quoting
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
44 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not govern the actions of United States officers searching
a house located in Mexico and owned by a nonresident alien). But see Gerald P.
Lbpez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of aJustImmigrationLaw andPolicy,
28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 695-707 (1981) (arguing that the United States owes a duty to
Mexican citizens based on the proximity of Mexico to the United States, the
dependence ofAmerican industry on Mexican labor, and as a result of past injustice).
45 Recall Thoreau's "majority of one": "A wise man will not leave the right to the
mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is
but little virtue in the action of masses of men." HENRY D. THOREAU, Civil
Disobedience, in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 116 (Carl Bode ed., 1947).
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serious differences within a community is to recommend a revitalized federalism. 46 These recommendations are very vague and
nonspecific, 47 but whatever form the new federalist political
structure may take, it would certainly mean taking power away from
the federal government and giving that power to some local political
entity. I have argued elsewhere that on economic grounds this is a
bad idea. 48 My point here is that by recognizing important sub46 See e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 314-15 (suggesting that we revitalize "those
aspects of a federal system that were at least in the past an embodiment of the
republican tradition"); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1578 (stating that one of the
strengths of the original constitutional system was self-determination at the local
level).
47
These proposals are also potentially detrimental to the civic republican goal of
exercising political control over the use of private economic resources. It was only
a few years ago that the notion of federalism was used to attack national economic
regulation of economic entities that were organized on a national scale and crucial
to the national economy. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294-96 (1936)
(regulation of the coal industry); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1936)
(regulation of agricultural production). It is still used by modern conservatives to
undermine national economic legislation. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833,852 (1976) (prohibiting application of federal minimum wage and maximum
hour laws to "traditional" state and local governmental operations), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). It is difficult to ignore the
historically consistent ideological implications of proposals to reconstitute or revitalize
federalism in a world whose economy is composed largely of national and transnational economic entities. Therefore, how is one to judge the similar proposal made by
Professor Sunstein, who views the revitalization of federalism as a necessary
component of the civic republican revival, and links his proposal with criticism of the
"New Deal model" of government? In this respect, as in many others, the new left
is almost indistinguishable from the old right. For a detailed critique of the economic
and ideological implications of federalism, see Gey, supra note 42.
48 See Gey, supra note 42. Actually, it is only a bad idea from the perspective of
the political left, which is where the civic republicans under consideration here locate
themselves ideologically. A politically conservative theorist who sought to transfer
power from the national government to transnational corporate entities would have
no problem arguing in favor of a revitalized federalism. However, it makes sense
from aleftist perspective only if one hearkens back to ideas of the nineteenth century
utopian socialists. Even the most avid civic republican must admit that in the
twentieth century it is hard to take seriously Robert Owen's notion of bucolic 300 to
2,000-member communities, "capable of combining within themselves all the
advantages that city and country residences now afford, without any of the numerous
inconveniences and evils which necessarily attach to both those modes of society."
See ROBERT OWEN, Report to the County of Lanark, in A NEW VIEW OF SOCIETY AND
OTHER WRITINGS 265 (1927).
The parallels between the nineteenth century utopian socialists and the modern
civic republicans go beyond their mutual affection for down-home democracy. The
civic republicans share the utopian desire to realize a "second creation of humanity"
by "creating entirely new surroundings in which to place all through life, and by
which a new human nature would appear to arise from the new surroundings."
ROBERT OWEN, THE LIFE OF ROBERT OWEN: WRrITEN BY HIMSELF xliii (Frank Cass
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communities (and even sub-sub-communities) within a larger
community, the civic republicans seem to acknowledge the possibility of localized ideological diversity within the larger political
community. This, in turn, violates the basic civic republican ideal
49
of collective agreement on important political and social values.
The civic republican ideal is a community composed of citizens
who are committed to each other and their common project. This
indispensable community spirit requires a high degree of community permanence. 50
The civic republican concept of community
requires permanence because only through a long common history
can members of a community develop the "ties of friendship and
cooperation" that are necessary for the fulfillment of the civic
republican project. If a revitalization of federalism is a central
feature of modern civic republicanism, the new civic republican
citizen will be a member of several communities at once-the
national community, as well as several varieties of local communities
(state, county, city, school district, neighborhood, etc.).
But if
someone is a member of various communities at the same time, that
person will either favor one community to the detriment of the
others, or will not develop strong ties to any community, thus
rendering impossible the task of instilling the necessary civic virtue.
Indeed, the very nature of civic virtue requires that one community
must be allocated responsibility for developing the full range of
values that are necessary in a proper citizen. 5 1 This uniform
inculcation of values is defeated if the individual owes allegiance to

& Co. ed., 1967) (1857). Of course, just as I am arguing that the civic republicans
misjudge political reality in the modern world, the utopian socialists had their own
contemporary critics. For a succinct contemporary account of the flaws in the
Owenite system, see KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH R. ENGELS, SELECTED WORKs 383-84
(1968).
49 For a discussion of the civic republican emphasis on agreement as a regulative
ideal within the republican community, see infra notes 105-33 and accompanying text.
50 Obviously no community in history has lasted forever. I do not believe that in
order to support their theory the civic republicans must demonstrate that the civic
republican community will never disintegrate. But I do believe that the civic
republican view of government requires a community that will endure through several
generations of citizens. Civic republican principles also suggest that the community
will endeavor to last forever, by educatingyoung citizens to support the structure and
principles established by their ancestors. Unless the basic precepts of civic virtue are
simply impermanent political fashions (which relates back to the question of
essentialism, see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text), the community even has
a moral duty to perpetuate itself indefinitely.
" Recall the breadth of civic republican statements regarding the community's
role in creating proper citizens. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
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many different communities (some of which may not share the same
set of values) and each of those communities has responsibility for
only a small portion of the citizen's concerns.
Community permanence is further undermined by the geographic mobility that characterizes the modern world. If individuals may
move easily from one local community to another, each community
becomes merely a transient mixture of temporary members, none
of whom have any particular stake in the community's activities.
Here is the civic republican dilemma: without a revitalized
federalism, the current political community is far too large to
provide the kind of town-meeting democracy necessary to realize the
republican vision of self-government. Yet the very act of decentralizing the political structure factionalizes the community and
dissolves the bonds that tie citizens to their government. The civic
republicans are left pining for a world that no longer exists, in
which the economy is not organized on a national scale, people
never leave their home towns, and everyone in the community
shares the same basic values. These are the necessary conditions for
the successful realization of civic republicanism. If these conditions
do not exist, the civic republican project will inevitably fail because
its proponents cannot even locate a proper community.
2. The Nature of Participation in the Organic *Community
Another problem with the civic republican view of community
relates to the role of citizenship and political participation. In
particular, the civic republican scheme cannot account for citizen
apathy on any matter of political concern to some large part of the
community. Civic republicanism has an all-for-one-and-one-for-all
ethos that would seem to mandate total involvement of every citizen
on every issue. Yet in any political structure, many issues will arise
that greatly concern a small fraction of the membership, but have
little consequence for the majority of community members. An
individual citizen's expression of no interest in a particular issue (or
in politics or government altogether) will be viewed by
republicanism's organic community as a function of antisocial
maladjustment. A refusal to participate in the community's political
deliberation means that the citizen is off pursuing her private
preferences when she should be participating in a "collective
process of discovering and countering the distortions that under-
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lie" 52 her selfish desires. In an organic community, "not interested" is an unacceptable response to the civic republican call for
political participation.
The only thing worse than citizen apathy in an organic civic
republican community may be forced citizen participation. If the
civic republican community requires every member to participate in
making significant policy decisions regardless of the member's stake
or interest in the outcome, the civic republican system leaves itself
open for the very kind of political bargaining and horse-trading that
civic republicans find so repugnant about pluralist systems. Factions
within the community will have an incentive to form shifting
coalitions, creating a piecemeal policy-making process indistinguishable from pluralism.
Once again, the civic republicans are faced with an insoluble
dilemma. On the one hand, if the community is truly organic, every
citizen must have a say in the community's discussions and must
participate in the process in order to develop the properly virtuous
attitudes and values. On the other hand, if the community forces
citizens to participate against their will, a strongly motivated
minority will be able to manipulate the political process by obtaining support for their favored policies from unwilling participants in
exchange for an agreement to support the unwilling participants in
some later policy dispute. Unless the civic republicans make the
unrealistic and utopian presumption that all citizens agree about
important policy matters before political deliberation begins, their
organic community dissolves into a system indistinguishable from
the one whose problems civic republicanism is supposed to cure.
3. Enforcing the Organic Community's Decisions
In addition to the obvious difficulties of identifying the civic
republican community's legitimate members and defining the
parameters of the members' mandatory political participation, there
is yet one more problem. This problem relates to the enforcement
mechanism for the community's decisions. In civic republican
theory, the republican community is not simply a benign force that
merely advises its members on the morality of their thoughts and
behavior. Likewise, civic virtue is much more than a nonbinding
and unenforceable guide to good behavior-a sort of secular
decalogue. The civic republican community is the most powerful
52 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1136.
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collective agency in its designated territory. The community's policy
decisions-including the overriding policies that are incorporated
into "civic virtue"-may be embodied in law and enforced through
legal sanctions. The moral and political legitimacy granted to the
community is also granted to the governmental agencies that
assemble the community's decisions and enforce them.53 Like all
governments, the civic republican regime will have at its disposal
enforcement mechanisms that include the ultimate resort to force.
I make this rather obvious observation in order to counteract
the political imagery that suffuses most civic republican literature.
Civic republican discussions of politics are phrased in homey and
nonthreatening terms. Who but the most self-interested misanthrope could be opposed to a theory that relies primarily on
concepts like virtue, community, and dialogue? The images evoked
by civic republican proposals owe as much to Frank Capra's simple
tales of public spirit and political goodness as they do to anything
written by Madison or any of the other Framers friendly to civic
republican ideals.
As noted above, 54 modern civic republican thought takes as its
model of good political behavior the classical ideal of a small,
agrarian community's town meeting. But in the classical model of
small-scale, town-hall decision-making, there were not such clear
lines between the community itself and the government that does
the community's bidding. It did not stretch reality very much for
the classical civic republicans to describe their community as an
actual, organic entity. 55 In a preindustrial, sparsely populated
country, the individuals who made up the local political community
often were physically present when the decisions were made, knew
the persons who would be enforcing those decisions, and could
See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 38.41 and accompanying text.
53

55 This takes the classical civic republican view of community and citizenship at

face value. Of course, to do so ignores the fact that the classical civic republicans had
their own versions of the theoretical problems facing their modern successors. The
problem of community membership is one example. The classical model of the
community did not include women or the poor. See, e.g., HANNA F. PrrKIN, FORTUNE
IS A WOMAN: GENDER AND POLrTICS IN THE THOUGHT OF NIcCOL6 MACHIAVELLI 230-

40 (1984) (discussing the relationship between republican politics, misogyny, and
machismo). There was no objective reason for limiting membership in this way. It
simply seemed obvious to republicans of that era,just as it now seems obvious to the
modern eye that the classical republicans were blind to their own short-sightedness,

elitism, and misogyny. All their talk of virtue did not make the classical republicans
virtuous.

822

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 141:801

revisit the policy at the next meeting if they later reconsidered the
wisdom of their original decision.
In the modern, industrialized, urbanized, and much more
populous world it no longer makes sense to speak of a civic
republican "community." It especially does not make sense if the
word "community" is interpreted to include the people who live
within the community, the government that makes decisions about
policy, and the police and legal organizations that enforce that
policy. In the classical era one could justify on empirical grounds
the theoretical argument that these independent functions could be
subsumed within one term: "community." Today, the classical
community has exploded into many different collective entities,
each of which operates largely independently of the others. Yet the
modern civic republicans continue to use the classical term
"community" in much the same fashion as their predecessors.
I have alluded to some of the problems this broad view of
community creates in the modern world. I will return to these
problems in subsequent sections of this article. Before going into
greater detail about the problems posed in the modern world by an
overly powerful political community, however, I will complete the
overview of modern civic republican theory with a brief look at the
civic republican view of the individual who lives in the civic
republican community.
C. The Social Construction of the Individual
As noted in the last section, civic republican theory views
individuals as socially constructed. 56 That is, civic republican
theory considers an individual's beliefs and preferences to be merely
internalized reflections of the social context in which the individual
exists. "Under [a republican] regime, purely private preferences are
understood to be shaped by circumstances; they are social constructs." 57 Politics is important to the civic republicans because it
is the most powerful form of collective influence on individual
values. In Professor Sunstein's articulation of this point, civic
republican politics is described as the collective manifestation of
freedom, which in turn is defined as the "deliberative process in
which a person chooses her own ends and does not merely attempt
to satisfy whatever ends she 'has.'" 58 Thus, the function of politics
56 See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
57 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1133.
58 Id. at 1132-33. Professor Michelman draws on a similar conception from the
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"is to select values ...

or to provide opportunities for preference

59
formation rather than simply to implement existing desires."
Under the civic republican scheme, individual preferences (that
is, preferences formed outside the political arena) are by nature
inferior to values formed with the assistance of community dialogue
and government guidance.6 0 The preferences an individual brings
to the political process are entitled "at most to presumptive
respect." 6 1 One reason civic republicans give the community the
authority to override its members' private preferences is the
republican suspicion that an individual's unguided selection of
preferences is much more likely to favor short-term, first-order
preferences. In contrast, civic republican politics is directed toward
selecting long-term, second-order preferences, or what Sunstein calls
"preferences about preferences."62

Of course, individuals are capable of choosing second-order
preferences over first-order preferences without the intervention of
collective political pressure. 63 But the civic republicans argue that
collective determinations are far more likely than individual
determinations to result in the selection of wise second-order
preferences over imprudent first-order preferences. 64 Individuals
Kantian tradition: "In Kantian terms we are free only insofar as we are selfgoverning, directing our actions in accordance with law-like reasons that we adopt for
ourselves, as proper to ourselves, upon conscious, critical reflection on our identities
(or natures) and social situations." Michelman, supra note 4, at 26. Michelman's view
of Kantian theory is based largely on Charles Taylor's interpretation of Kant. See
CHARLES TAYLOR, Kant's Theory of Freedom, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 318 (1985). As Professor Michelman notes, Taylor
offers an unusually collectivist reading of Kant's theory. See Michelman, supra note
4, at 27 n.128.
59 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1545 (footnote omitted).
60 1 suspect civic republicans would object to my use of the phrase "government

guidance" in this sentence. Civic republicans tend to use terms like "political
freedom" or "self-government" to describe the phenomenon of collective value
determination. See, e.g., id. at 1557 (describing the "republican conception of
individual and political freedom"); Michelman, supra note 4, at 26 ("Another name
for positive freedom is self-government."). I choose the term "government guidance"
when describing the notion of collective value determination because I believe that
is a much more accurate description of how the civic republican system operates. See
infra notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
61 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1133.
62 Id. at 1140.
63 Sunstein himself cites one real-world example (private pensions) and one
mythical example (Ulysses ordering his sailors to tie him to the ship's mast to keep
him from succumbing to the Sirens' songs). Id. at 1140-41. The Ulysses example is
the metaphorical focus ofJon Elster's book on this subject. SeeJON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36 (rev. ed. 1984).
' Even if this is true, it doesn't necessarily distinguish the civic republican system
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operating outside the process of collective deliberation may not
even be able correctly to distinguish first-order from second-order
preferences. Indeed, when the civic republicans assert that private
preferences tend to be distorted,6 5 they imply that individuals may
not be capable of independently formulating any preferences that
could properly be called their own. An individual choice may
simply be a reflection of an unjust system of power relationships
that have produced in the individual the incorrect belief that she
wants a particular thing. In reality, the civic republicans argue, the
individual may not want the thing that she thinks she wants because
she has only been taught to want the thing by someone else who will
benefit from her choice. Get it? She's been duped. Sunstein even
has a descriptive phrase for this phenomenon: "the notion of
66
coercion understood as consent."
This Orwellian phrase is typical of how civic republicans
describe the role of the individual in society.
Modern civic
republicans have a tendency to lapse into their own brand of
newspeak, which sometimes cloaks or inhibits understanding of
what is being proposed. Thus, when Professor Sunstein says that

from ordinary pluralism. Pluralist political systems can also produce what Sunstein
would label a second-order preference. Sunstein cites welfare programs as one
example of a second-order preference produced by the political system. Sunstein,
supra note 31, at 1140-41. Yet welfare programs can easily be explained as a product
of pluralist bargaining. Under a pluralist model, the poor could logically support
welfare because they would benefit directly from payments under the program. The
middle class could logically support welfare as a safety net against their (or their
relatives') potential poverty due to unemployment or poor health. And the rich could
logically support welfare in order to prevent the creation of a starving, hopeless, and
potentially revolutionary economic underclass. Alternatively, welfare programs could
simply be explained as the outcome of old-fashioned political horse trading. Under
this scenario, one political faction could obtain a welfare program in exchange for
supporting another faction's proposal for tax cuts on upper-income citizens. Under
the second scenario it would be inaccurate even to refer to the welfare program as
a second-order preference, since the program's real supporters are actually benefiting
immediately from the political decision.
65 See e.g., id. at 1133 ("[Plurely private preferences are understood to be shaped
by circumstances; they are social constructs."); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 10
("[P]references are.., a function of current information, consumption patterns, legal
rules, and general social pressures.").

66Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1157. One of Sunstein's models is the branch of
feminism that favors the censorship of'pornography partly on the ground that people
want pornography solely because they have been instructed to want it by a
paternalistic system. See id. at 1156-57. I will return to this example below. See infra
notes 229-44 and accompanying text. On the many problems with this approach to
regulation of sexually explicit speech, see Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression:
The Regulation of Pornographyas Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1564 (1988).
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"individual freedom consists not in the implementation but instead
in the selection of ends," 67 he is using the term "individual
freedom" to mean the subordination of an individual's preferences
to the direction of the community (whose decisions are enforced, of
course, by the officers of the community's government). The
republicans permit (indeed, require) the individual to participate in
the community's "selection of ends," but it is ultimately the
community's decision-not the individual's-that matters. Once the
community acts to select its preferred goals, "individual freedom"
requires the individual to go along with that collective determination.68 The proper civic republican citizen will not just go along
with the collective determination, but will actually try very hard to
internalize this decision and adopt the community's values as his or
her own. The civic republican notion of "individual freedom is
therefore the hollow freedom to submit to the community's
69
collective moral and political decisions.
67 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1557.

8 The fact that the citizen is permitted to participate in the dialogue that
produces a collective decision does not make the decision a product of "individual
freedom," nor is individual freedom protected by the possibility that an individual
may agree with the collective decision. The only logical test for individual freedom

is the individual right to choose between opposing alternatives. Under the civic
republican system, the collective determination of value preferences is the final
determinant of individual choice: the collective determination narrows the field of
permissible individual choices to one. That may not restrict the freedom of the
winners of the collective political dialogue, who are permitted to continue doing what
they want, but the same cannot be said for those who lose the political struggle.
69 My earlier reference to Orwell was not intended as a metaphorical clich6 or a
cheap shot at the civic republicans. There are some uncomfortable parallels between
aspects of civic republican theory-including the notion that individual freedom is the
submission to the community-and the cold, Machiavellian musings of Orwell's
Oceanic inquisitor O'Brien. O'Brien and the civic republicans do not view individual
freedom very differently. For example, during Winston's interrogation, O'Brien
argues that Winston should subsume his petty individual freedom into the more
liberating and satisfying collective freedom represented by the Party. O'Brien tells
Winston:
The first thing you must realize is that power is collective. The individual
only has power in so far as he ceases to be an individual. You know the
Party slogan: "Freedom is Slavery." Has it ever occurred to you that it is
reversible? Slavery is freedom. Alone-free-the human being is always
defeated. It must be so, because every human being is doomed to die,
which is the greatest of all failures. But if he can make complete, utter
submission, if he can escape from his identity, if he can merge himself in
the Party so that he is the Party, then he is all-powerful and immortal.
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 267 (1949).
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Civic republicans cannot countenance individual freedom that
manifests itself as dissent to society's collectively determined basic
values. Professor Sunstein denies that hostility to dissent is a
characteristic of civic republican political systems:
"Indeed,
republicans see disagreement as a creative and productive force,
highly congenial to and even an indispensable part of the basic
republican faith in political dialogue." 70 However, this assurance
rings false when it follows Sunstein's description of civic republicanism's belief in universalism, which "affirms ... that some perspectives are better than others, and that that claim can be vindicated
71
through discussion with those initially skeptical."
It follows that if some "perspectives are better than others," then
other perspectives are simply wrong. Sunstein confirms this
conclusion, asserting that "[d]esires as well as acts may be irrational
or wrong." 72 If the state's function is to root out irrational or
wrong desires, as Sunstein implies, 73 then the state should prohibit
dissenters from advocating or pursuing those desires. Indeed, if the
civic republican state is doing its job-which is primarily to inculcate
civic virtue 7 4--it should go beyond simply preventing public
advocacy of "wrong" preferences and attempt to correct the
individual's misguided desires. The civic republican scheme uses
nonthreatening terms to describe this corrective socialization
process. As Professor Sunstein says-and as every successful
absolutist ruler understands-"Education and prevailing morality...
provide the principal lines of defense against the dangers of
75
faction."
When equipped with a definition of freedom that amounts to
the absence of freedom, or a notion like "coercion understood as
consent," 76 the civic republicans can justify virtually any governmental intrusion into the individual persona, while simultaneously
disavowing any intent to interfere with personal preferences they
deem legitimate. Thus, the civic republican system is overtly
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1575.
Id. at 1574.
72 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1135.
73 See Sunstein, supranote 32, at 5 ("The phenomenon of endogenous preferences
casts doubt on the notion that a democratic government ought to respect private
desires and beliefs in all or almost all contexts.").
74
See Sherry, supra note 10, at 551 ("[R]epublicanism finds its primary purpose
to be definition of community values and creation of the public and private virtue
necessary for societal achievement of those values.").
75 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.
76 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1157.
70
71
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paternalistic, although even in this respect the civic republicans
attempt to have their cake and eat it too. For example, Professor
Sunstein's version of the civic republican argument disavows
paternalism in general as a justification for community or government intervention into personal preferences, but approves of a
special variety of paternalism when necessary to pierce the veil of
"coercion understood as consent." "The [permissible] paternalistic
claim is that there is a difference between actual interests and
interests as subjectively perceived. Subjectively perceived interests
may be the products of some kind of distortion. If so, 'paternalism'
may be justified." 77 Although Sunstein recognizes the difficulties
inherent in separating "actual interests" from "interests as subjectively perceived,"78 in a civic republican state it simply must be
done. "[T]he nature and extent of... malfunctions [in a system
based on private preferences] will support considerable legislative
79
and judicial intrusion into private preference structures."
The suggested distinction between "actual interests" and
"interests as subjectively perceived" raises the more important issue
of individual autonomy, which lies behind questions concerning
civic republicanism's paternalistic nature. As noted above, civic
republican theory is premised on the assertion that the state does
not always have to respect private preferences.8 0 This assertion,
in turn, is premised on the theory that an individual's seemingly
autonomous decisions concerning private preferences may not be
truly autonomous. Since individual values are social constructs,
"[s]ome current preferences may thus not be autonomous, and legal
81
intervention may be necessary in order to promote autonomy."
When Professor Sunstein uses the term "autonomy" in this quote,
he is referring to individual autonomy from coercion by collective
forces that "construct" the individual. The irony is that Sunstein
proposes that one collective entity step in to protect the individual
from another collective entity. Thus, we have another Orwellian
twist in civic republican theory:
individual autonomy from
collective coercion can be protected only by collectively overriding
some individual decisions.
77 Id. at 1171.
78
Id.

79 Id. at 1172.
80 This premise is the general subject of two articles by Professor Sunstein. See
Sunstein, supra note 31; Sunstein, supra note 32.

81 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1133.
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There is another, more basic aspect to this paradox. The civic
republican view that individuals are socially constructed from
collective influences in society is inconsistent with the many
references within the civic republican literature to "private preferences"8 2 and "private interests."83
If an individual's private
preferences are all socially constructed, then there is really no such
thing as an individual or private preference. Therefore, what
Sunstein calls "private preferences" are really examples of collective
preferences. In contrast to these non-governmental collective
preferences, the distinguishing feature of the government's own
collective preferences is that the collective entity known as the
government has a larger number of members and more power to
enforce its preferences on both individuals and other, weaker
collectives within society. If the different preferences within society
are viewed from this perspective, the proper dichotomy is not (as
the civic republicans claim) between "public values and private
interests" so much as it is between collective interests "X" and
collective interests "Y."
This seemingly minor disagreement about descriptive terminology is important because the distinction between private interests and
public values is the primary basis for civic republicanism's appeal.
Modern civic republicans, like their classical forbearers, heavily
emphasize a conception of politics in which citizens are willing to
"subordinate their private interests to the general good." 84
Discarding the dichotomy between private interests and public
values alters the moral equation that legitimates the exercise of
governmental power in the civic republican system. If the competition within society over preferences-and "preference about
preferences" 8 5 -is simply a competition among different collective
entities, each of which can claim by reference to its own value
system that its interests are legitimate, then there is no reason
automatically to give one collective entity moral priority over
another. If the government is simply one of many collective social
entities competing for influence and control over its individual
members, then the government is robbed of the moral superiority
82 Sunstein, supra note 31.
83 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 31.

8 Id. at 31; see also Sherry, supra note 10, at 552-54 (asserting that during the
Revolutionary era, "[t]he common good was ... paramount to the good of
individuals").
85 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1140.
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it is assigned by civic republican theory, and the government's
interests cannot always trump the interests of other, smaller
collective entities within society. "Civic virtue" thus becomes
indistinguishable from the "private preferences" generated by other
collective entities in society, except insofar as "civic virtue" reflects
one collective entity's greater power to sanctify its preferences and
force the entire society to adopt and abide by them.
The civic republicans do not, of course, agree that all collective
social entities are created equal. Their theory revolves around the
presumption that some collective entities are more equal than
others. In civic republican theory, the community and its enforcement arm-i.e., the government-are singled out from every other
form of collective entity and given special authority. The reasons
for doing so are problematic. As I have already indicated, one
group of civic republican arguments for singling out the community
seems premised on a strain of essentialism.8 6 By claiming that the
community and government are more likely to discover and
cultivate civic virtue, the civic republicans seem to maintain that the
community and government get their moral priority because they
are more likely to realize an objective set of values labelled "civic
virtue" than other collective entities composed of a narrower range
of members.
The civic republicans themselves deny, somewhat implausibly,
that their theory posits the existence of a predefined and objective
set of ethical principles, which all proper civic republican communities will endorse.8 7 But if the civic republican system cannot be
justified on essentialist principles, the civic republicans have the
much harder task of demonstrating that the republican scheme of
86

See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.

87 For example, Sunstein states that "it would be a mistake to suggest that the
republican commitments as described here lead directly to a particular social theory
or a particular set of institutional arrangements." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1576.
Michelman describes the "practical reason" that must guide modern civic republican
theory in similarly nonessentialist terms: "It must be a process of normative
justification without ultimate objectivist foundations-ofjustifying social choice, in the
sense of satisfying all contenders without denying that their conflicts, of interest or
of vision, are deep and possibly enduring." Michelman, supra note 4, at 23. In my
view these claims about the open-ended nature of the civic republican system are
irreconcilable with claims (which Sunstein relies upon far more than Michelman) that
civic republicanism is a "universalist" theory that "reflects a belief that debate and
discussion help to reveal that some values are superior to others." Sunstein, supra
note 4, at 31-32; see also Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554 (stating that the "universalist"
nature of civic republicanism entails rejection of ethical relativism and skepticism).
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politics and government has some practical advantage over other
forms of political organization. In particular, the civic republicans
must demonstrate that governmental collective entities are not
susceptible to the same malfunctions that the civic republicans find
evident in nongovernmental collective entities. The next section of
88
this article focuses on this aspect of civic republican theory.
Before turning to the civic republican conception of individual
action within the "organic" community, one more point must be
made about the civic republican view of the individuals who make
up that community. The civic republican axiom that the government should not automatically implement the preferences of its
citizens8 9 reflects civic republicanism's highly skeptical view of
individual autonomy. Despite the civic republican overtures to
promoting individual autonomy through legal intervention, 9° civic
republican thought seems to rest on the contrary assumption that
there is no such thing as individual autonomy. How else is one to
explain the civic republican claim that there is "a difference between
actual interests and interests as subjectively perceived?" 91 The
implication seems to be that the individual's view of his or her
interests are by definition and in every instance flawed.9 2 The
civic republicans believe that the individual is incapable of ascertaining his or her "actual interests" without governmental assistance
because they believe the individual unconsciously internalizes the
interests of larger social forces. The best the individual can do is to
"subjectively perceive" an imprecise and fundamentally inaccurate
reflection of his or her "actual" interests, just as Plato's caveSee infra part II.B.1.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1134 (describing Madison's conception of
national government being "above the fray," and therefore able to "deliberate on the
public good" instead of merely following "constituent desires").
90 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1171.
92 By "flawed" I mean that they are either substantively wrong or at least tentative
and incomplete until they have been verified by the community at large. Sunstein
does not acknowledge an exception to the general rule of civic republican government that "private preferences are, by virtue of their status as such, entitled at most
to presumptive respect." Id. at 1133. In other words, all private preferences must
be analyzed by the government before they are certified as "actual interests" as
opposed to "interests as subjectively perceived." Id. at 1171. Sunstein is not alone
among civic republicans in taking this position. Professor Michelman adopts the
Kantian view that "the human condition implies that self-cognition and ensuing selflegislation must, to a like extent, be socially situated; norms must be formed through
public dialogue and expressed as public law. Normative reason, it then seems, cannot
be a solitary activity." Michelman, supra note 4, at 27 (footnote omitted).
8

89
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dwellers could see only the shadows of reality on the cave wall.
Civic republican theory places the individual at the mercy of
governmental manipulation both because the theory views individual
autonomy as chimerical and because it views collective manipulation
of individuals as inevitable in any case.
The civic republicans are likely to object to my characterization
of their theory on the ground that what they actually propose does
not entail manipulation of individuals at all, but rather "selfgovernment." Under a civic republican system, the argument goes,
each individual will actively participate in developing the values that
later take the form of normative judgments and legal rules. Indeed,
the government will not do anything to an individual that is against
the individual's wishes.94 The object of civic republicanism, we are
95
repeatedly reminded, is individual freedom.
Given the dim view civic republicans have of individual
autonomy, however, it is difficult to take much solace in their claims
about either self-government or individual freedom. In the first
place, given the tainted nature of all unreconstructed (i.e., prerepublican) individual psyches, how is this process of self-government ever supposed to get started? If every individual coming to
the opening session of the civic republican town meeting is
hopelessly deluded by his or her "subjectively perceived" interests,
who is supposed to first direct everyone's attention to the group's
"actual" interests? Also, if all individual perspectives and preferences are distorted and susceptible to manipulation by "social processes
that occur 'behind the back' of the actor involved," 6 how do we
know that the happy outcome of the civic republican political
process is not simply the result of a much more sophisticated and
complicated process of social conditioning? Isn't itjust as likely-by
the very terms of civic republicanism's own skeptical view of
individual autonomy-that individuals can be duped by unassailable
notions such as "civic virtue" into signing over their individual
93 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 256-61 (A.D. Lindsay ed., 1957).
" That is to say, the government will not do anything to an individual that the
individual would not truly desire, if the individual knew what was good for her. In
Sunstein's words, the individual will permit the government to enact measures that
Umay be... in part an effort by the public to protect itself against its own misguided
choices." Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1141.
95 Individual freedom is defined, in the civic republican fashion, as "not in the
implementation but instead in the selection of ends." Sunstein, supranote 2, at 1557.
See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
96 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1133 n.16.
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freedom and intellectual independence to other members of the
community who can manipulate more effectively the new civic
republican political processes? Finally, if the civic republican
community gives all prepolitical preferences "at most ...

presump-

tive respect,"9 7 then why do the civic republicans get to set the
ground rules forjustifying political decisions before the deliberative
98
process even starts?

The civic republican view of the individual operating within
society contains a number of contradictory claims. On the one
hand, the individual is socially constructed, with distorted private
preferences. On the other hand, that same individual is somehow
capable of overcoming these distortions to create a government in
which the "private interests" will be trumped by a group of "public
values." Likewise, the civic republicans contend that the object of
government is "political freedom" and "self-government." 99 Yet
the community gets to impose its own definition of freedom on its
members, and self-government can occur only within the context of
precisely defined guidelines for proper decisionmaking. 0 On
one hand, individuals are encouraged to bring their differences to
the political process. 01' On the other hand, republican theory
97

Id. at 1133.

98 For example, Sunstein insists that in order to survive scrutiny by the civic

republican state, "spheres of autonomy for individuals and groups must be defended
on some ground; they cannot bejustified as prepolitical; and if the defense is to be
persuasive, it will have to incorporate republican notions of deliberation and
universalism." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1575. Also, the supposedly wide-open
republican deliberative process is constrained by an enhanced rationality requirement,
defined as "a requirement that regulatory measures be something other than a
response to political pressure." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 49. The freedom of the
individuals participating in the civic republican political process is thus channeled by
policy determinations (and indeed, by the guidelines of a particular political theory)
that the participants did not adopt and cannot challenge. A participant who disagrees
with the civic republican view of the political world-and thus who insists that all
political decisions are responses to self-interested political pressure-must abandon
these views and conform to the republican perspective before participating in the
deliberations. If the recalcitrant citizen insists on his/her idiosyncratic pluralist views
of the overall nature of politics, he/she will simply be left out of the group's
deliberations about particular policies, since the pluralist will not be able honestly to
present an appropriately "universalist" republican justification for any policy.
99 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
100 See supra note 98.
101See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1574 (stating that "the principle of
universalism does not ... assert that political participants must put their private
complaints to one side when they come to politics").
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asserts that "some perspectives are better than others, and that that
10 2
claim can be vindicated through discussion."
The civic republicans attempt to resolve these contradictory
tendencies through a view of government that is filtered through
the concepts of dialogue and consensus. The next section discusses
these concepts and their role in integrating the socially constructed
individual into the organic community.
II. DIALOGUE AND CONSENSUS: INTEGRATING THE SOCIALLY
CONSTRUCTED INDIVIDUAL INTO THE ORGANIC COMMUNITY

As the discussion in the previous section indicates, civic
republicans view "private preferences" as especially susceptible to
distortion by non-governmental collective forces within society. The
civic republican response to this problem is to give the community
and its government the power to control and revise presumptively
"nonautonomous" individual preferences.
This solution raises
several issues. For example, why do the civic republicans believe
that one form of collective power-the community and its government-will produce better, more autonomous decisions than all
other forms of collective power? How can the civic republicans
rebut the contention that collective political bodies are indistinguishable from other collective power centers in society?
The civic republicans claim that civic virtue is the product of a
well-functioning republican state. But how do we know that the
collective political body's conclusions about virtue are not just as
distorted as the beliefs and preferences of its nonautonomous
individual members? How can any theory give one collective entity
first priority in determinations of value without begging the
question that should be answered by the process itself: what are the
society's "preferences about preferences?"1 03 It would seem that
any political theory that grants one collective entity this kind of
ultimate priority has answered the important questions at the outset
by denying legitimacy to individuals and nongovernmental entities
advancing competing conceptions of human nature, society, and
politics. If so, the civic republicans undermine their own claim that
their system facilitates self-government and individual freedom, and
their theory is seriously at odds with any logical conception of a
10 4
democratic political order.

102 Id.
103 See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1138.
104 For a more extended discussion of this subject, see infra notes 144-80 and
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A. Dialogue and Consensus: The Theory
The civic republicans' response to these questions can be found
in their proposals regarding the proper workings of the political
process. These proposals rely primarily on two key concepts:
dialogue and consensus. The two concepts are intimately related,
because republicans believe the outcome of successful dialogue will
always be consensus. "[R]epublican approaches posit the existence
of a common good, to be found at the conclusion of a well-functioning deliberative process." 10 5 This approach connects, in turn,
with civic republicanism's "universalist" presumptions about the
clear distinction between civic virtue and civic vice. "[The republican] conception reflects a belief that debate and discussion help to
reveal that some values are superior to others." 10 6 Thus, although
citizens are encouraged to bring their differences to the debate, 10 7 the republican expectation is that the differences will
disappear or be abandoned at the debate's conclusion. "The
republican commitment to universalism amounts to a belief in the
possibility of mediating different approaches to politics, or different
conceptions of the public good, through discussion and dialogue." l0 8
The republican political process "is designed to
produce substantively correct outcomes," 10 9 which will be accept110
ed by all members of society once the process is complete.
For all the importance of dialogue and consensus in the
republican political scheme, there is little explanation in the civic
republican literature of how one leads to the other. For example,
the civic republicans provide few specifics about the framework they
would use to reconcile the differences that participants bring to the
political process. The best they can do is provide some recommendations about the appropriate characteristics of a republican citizen;
a community composed of citizens having these characteristics
presumably could be trusted to fill in the details of a proper

accompanying text.
105 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
106 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 31-32.
107 "Deliberation is undermined, not promoted, by an expectation that differently
situated individuals and groups will say the same thing." Sunstein, supra note 2, at

1564.
108
Id. at 1554.
0
1 9 Id.

110 The outcome will be accepted by all members of society because the citizens
havejoined the process in order to "escape private interests and engage in pursuit of
the public good." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 31.
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republican governmental process. Civic republicans emphasize two
characteristics of a republican citizen as especially important in
mediating differences within the civic republican political process.
The first is what Professor Sunstein calls "political empathy.""'
The civic republican belief that politics will produce a consensus
regarding the common good "depends on a commitment to political
empathy, embodied in a requirement that political actors attempt
to assume the position of those who disagree." 112 A complementary aspect of empathy is that citizens should be encouraged to
distance themselves from personal circumstances, and therefore
from an individualistic point of view. Citizens joining the political
process should put aside their own perspective and "'think from the
1 13
point of view of everybody.'

Practical reason is the other commonly cited characteristic of the
good civic republican citizen. "Denying that decisions about values
are merely matters of taste, the republican view assumes that
'practical reason' can be used to settle social issues."1 1 4 Professor
Michelman cites practical reason as the civic republican's response
to "Cartesian Anxiety," which is "Richard Bernstein's term for the
sense of being caught between objectivism ('the belief that there are
or must be some fixed, permanent constraints to which we can
appeal and which are secure and stable') and relativism (the
Imessage... that there are no ... constraints except those that we
... accept')."n 5 Practical reason is the vehicle by which civic

republicanism overcomes the ethical dilemma of Cartesian Anxiety.
Practical reason will resolve this dilemma by facilitating the
"recovery of practical knowledge, situated judgment, dialogue, and
civic friendship." 116 Practical reason dovetails with an understanding of freedom as "positive" rather than "negative."11 7 That
11 Sunstein, supra note 2,at 1555.
112 Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Sherry endorses a feminist version of the
same idea, noting parallels between the classical republican paradigm and recent
feminist studies concluding that "women tend to have a more intersubjective sense
of self than men and that the feminine perspective is therefore more other-directed."
Sherry, supra note 10, at 584.
13 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1569 (quoting Susan M. Okin,Reason and Feeling in
Thinking aboutJustice, 99 ETHics 229, 244 (1989)).

114 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.
115 Michelman, supra note 4, at 24 n.1 10 (quoting RICHARDJ. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND

OBJECTVISM
AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAxs 19 (1983)).
11

6Id.at 25.
117 This taxonomy comes from ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR

ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
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is, the civic republicans incorporate practical reason into their view
that "only freedom in a 'positive' sense-action and self-direction
according to reasons, but reasons one gives to oneself-is morally
118
significant or valuable."
Neither of these proposed characteristics of the republican
citizen is objectionable in theory. Empathy is an admirable human
attitude, which can produce in individuals a laudably nonjudgmental
approach to life in a pluralistic society. In the political sphere,
empathy is a trait we want political participants to possess in
abundance. Empathy undoubtedly will help political participants
assess and devise solutions to social problems involving unfamiliar
individuals or social groups. The political solution to any problem
must rest on a determination of why the problem arose and what
the likely consequences of a solution might be. Political actors will
make these determinations most effectively if they empathize with
the persons affected by their political decisions.
Likewise, the "practical reason" endorsed by civic republicans is
little more than a relatively uncontroversial assertion that a different
form of rationality guides political as opposed to scientific analysis.
This assertion derives from Jfirgen Habermas's distinction between
the narrow "technical" rationality that characterizes the empiricalanalytic sciences, 119 and the broader, "practical" and "emancipa120
tory" rationality that controls other aspects of human affairs.
However, Habermas is not alone either in criticizing the objectivism
sometimes attributed to technical rationality or in noting that the
instrumental nature of technical rationality renders it inapplicable
121
to the value-laden decisions that characterize political analysis.
Michelman, supra note 4, at 25. In contrast, "negative" freedom is the view
that "freedom depends strictly on protection of individual subjectivity against social
oppression." Id. at 26.
119 See JORGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTEREsTS 308 (Jeremy J.
Shapiro trans., 1971). The objective of the empirical-analytic sciences is to devise
accurate hypotheses about observable, empirical reality. "Technical" rationality is
thus the mechanism by which an observer directs and controls observations that are
"supposed to be reliable in providing immediate evidence without the admixture of
subjectivity." Id.
120 See id. The "practical" and "emancipatory" forms of rationality are distinguished from the "technical" interest in that they involve self-reflection and
intersubjectivity among other observers of the relevant phenomenon. See id. at 310.
This subjective ingredient of "practical" and "emancipatory" rationality distinguishes
them from the "technical control over objectified processes" that characterizes
empirical-analytic sciences. Id. at 309.
121 To avoid further complicating an already complicated subject, I am avoiding
a full discussion of Habermas's social philosophy and its connection to modern civic
118
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As Richard Rorty has pointed out, political philosophers from
different perspectives "agree that rationality is what history and
society make it-that there is no overarching ahistorical structure
(the Nature of Man, the laws of human behavior, the Moral Law, the
122
Nature of Society) to be discovered."
republican thought. I will note, however, that there are many parallels between
Habermas's work and the main concepts of civic republicanism. The emphasis both
theories place on "practical reason" is noted in the text accompanying this note. The
concepts of dialogue and consensus, which are the organizing principles of civic
republican politics, are also central to Habermas's conception of "communicative
action," by which political actors attempt to reach an understanding and orient
themselves to future common action. See JORGEN HABERMAS, 1 THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 101 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984).
Like the civic republicans, Habermas attempts to define the ideal communicative
environment in which effective political dialogue should take place. According to
Habermas, this environment (which he calls the "ideal speech situation") is governed
by universal norms of discourse. See STEPHEN K. WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF
JORGEN HABERMAS: REASON, JUSTICE, AND MODERNITY 56 (1988). As in the civic
republican system, these rules will largely determine the scope of political control
over individual action in society, and will therefore also frame and channel the
substance of the decisions made by the political participants. Habermas's three
universal rules of the ideal speech situation seem to be the basis for the three
characteristics Professor Michelman attributes to normative interchange within the
civic republican community. See Michelman, supra note 4, at 32-33.
One of Habermas's universal norms is that speakers should not be coerced.
Thus, like the civic republicans, Habermas demands that the participants in his ideal
system be immunized from the effects of deception, power, and ideology. See WHITE,
supra, at 56. Along the same lines, Habermas and the civic republicans believe that
the views of individuals are increasingly dictated by insidious social forces beyond
individual control. In Habermas's phrase, the individual is being subjected to the
"colonization of the lifeworld." See id. at 107-15. This occurs "as the media of money
and power increasingly infiltrate spheres of social life in which traditions and
knowledge are transferred, in which normative bonds are intersubjectively established,
and in which responsible persons are formed." Id. at 112.
Habermas's primary focus on the manipulation of individual "lifeworlds" leads
him to expend much of his "emancipatory" energy on suggestions for reconstructing
a different, authentic lifeworld to take the place of the tainted, "colonized" one that
presently limits human progress. Jfirgen Habermas, New Social Movements, 49 TELOS
33, 35-37 (1981). Thus, Habermas has subordinated the traditional emphasis leftist
theory places on economic relations to an analysis of the process by which all social
relations (including the economic) are rationalized andjustified. In his own words,
he focuses not on "problems of distribution" but on the "grammar of forms of life."
Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted). Habermas's concentration on the "grammar of forms
of life" is reflected in the civic republican emphasis on civic virtue and the
socialization of the citizen-subjects that would not have been the focal point of an
earlier generation of social reformers, for whom economics was the key to rectifying
social injustice. By turning away from "problems of distribution," both Habermas and
the civic republicans at best diminish their theories' progressive appeal, and at worst
risk adopting an antidemocratic and potentially repressive model for state action. See
infra notes 267-324 and accompanying text.
122 RICHARD RORTY, Method, Social Science, and Social Hope, in CONSEQUENCES OF
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The problem with the civic republican assertions about empathy
and practical reason lies not with the concepts themselves but with
how they are used in the modern republican scheme of dialogical
government. Empathy and practical reason are fairly simple and
unobjectionable concepts. But civic republicans use these characteristics to produce a systepn that can only be defined by yet another
batch of civic republican oxymorons. We are left with a system
characterized by (to paraphrase Michelman) "difference as sameness," 123 or (in Sherry's words) a "community of diversity."124
Sunstein's oxymoronic label for his version of civic republican
theory is "liberal republicanism," 125 a term representing
Sunstein's attempt to conjoin the contrary tendencies of the two
main branches of modern political and legal theory. The problem
with these Janus-faced descriptions of civic republicanism's
objectives is that the melding of opposites rarely works. One of the
two opposing tendencies is inevitably subordinated to the other.
Members of a social group cannot be different and also the
same. They might share a willingness to respect their individual
differences, but mutual respect is a fundamentally different concept
than commonality. A community characterized by commonality
agrees to march in the same direction; a community characterized
by mutual respect agrees not to march as a community at all (and
also not to prevent its members from marching on their own).
Members of the latter sort of community are "the same" only in the
limited sense that they all are subject to the same rules of belief and
behavior (i.e., none save those necessary to preserve other members'
autonomy), but they are not "the same." Members of a community
defined by mutual respect therefore agree with each other, but only
about the fact that they disagree.
Empathy is therefore an important characteristic for members
of a community that agrees to disagree about the fundamental
values that guide the community members' lives. But the civic
republican project is exactly the opposite of such a system. If it is
true to its basic principles, the civic republican community cannot
agree to disagree. In order to make civic republicanism work,
consensus is necessary. At some point, the community members'
PRAGMATISM 191, 204 (1982).

123 See Michelman, supra note 4, at 32 ("[A]wareness of interdependence invites
recognition of how our sameness is our difference.").
124 Sherry, supra note 10, at 615.
125 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1566-71.
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differences must be transformed into similarity. Some individual
square pegs will have to be shaved to fit the community's round
holes. A community can be diverse, but it cannot remain diverse
(that is, truly diverse in the sense of disagreeing about ethical
fundamentals) if the community possesses the kind of power the
civic republicans would give it. At the very least, a truly diverse
community must give up the central civic republican desiderata of
universalism, consensus, and civic virtue. Civic republican disclaimers aside, 126 the civic republican project cannot exist without
those central objectives.

127

The civic republican's friendly gestures toward individual
differences within the community are both very broad and very
misleading. "Difference," Professor Michelman says about the
modern civic republican community, "becomes what we have in
common, the sought-for common ground that enables us to
contribute to one another's freedom." 128 This statement is
misleading because its reference to common differences describes
only the unmediated raw material of the community-that is, the
unmediated, unreconciled citizens prior to the process that leads to
the formation of a proper civic republican community. Michelman's
statement gives us a snapshot of the community's members before
the community has a chance to "mediate" or "reconcile" those
differences through dialogue and consensus. 129 After the discor126 See e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1555 ("It would be fanciful to suggest that
different conceptions of the good life can or should always be mediated through
politics.").
127 Following the disclaimer quoted in supra note 126, Sunstein continues: "The
republican position is not that every issue is subject to political resolution; it is instead
that some questions can yield general agreement through deliberation. A conception
of politics that disregards this fact will be doomed to repeat the failings of pluralism."
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1555. What Sunstein does not say is that the "some
questions" that civic republicans claim will "yield general agreement through
deliberation" must be the most basic questions concerning society and the individual's
role within it. (Otherwise, civic republicanism would be a trivial theory, suggesting
the possibility of consensus only on ancillary questions of slight interest while
deferring to dread pluralism on the most compelling issues of central importance to
society.) Therefore, if the civic republicans are wrong, and the most important
contested issues of social and individual value are not susceptible to general
agreement through deliberation, then the civic republicans must concede defeat. To
paraphrase Sunstein, a conception of politics that disregards this fact will be doomed
to repeat the failings of republicanism.
128 Michelman, supra note 4, at 33.
12 Michelman prefers the verb "reconcile." According to Michelman, the civic
republican project involves an "ethical reconciliation through dialogue, in search of
freedom." Id. "Depending on perspective, the opposites undergoing'reconciliation'
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dant, differentiated citizens leave their private differences at the
door and enter into the community dialogue, they are exposed to
"We
what Michelman calls "various reconciliatory projects":
recognize, reflect, define, enlighten, and transform one another as
we ourselves are reciprocally recognized, reflected, defined,
enlightened, and transformed." 130 The community is formed only
after its raw material-the pre-reconciled citizens in all their
differentiated glory-undergo this reconciliatory process and decide
to subordinate their earlier disagreements and differences to their
new common goals. In Sunstein's words, the citizens "escape
private interests and engage in pursuit of the public good." 3 1 At
this point, however, it no longer makes sense to say, as Michelman
does, that difference is what the citizens have in common. If
differences remain at the end of this process, the "reconciliatory" or
"mediating" functions of the civic republican community have
32
failed.,
The civic republicans prefer to focus on the dialogue that
characterizes their favored community. But the civic republicans do
not pursue the implications of an even more important fact of all
political processes: at some point the dialogue must end, a decision
must be made, and the community's decisions must be enforced.
Of course, the other option is that the dialogue could end without
reconciliation-it could end with an agreement to disagree-but as
a matter of faith civic republicans do not admit that this inconclusive result is a possibility. "It is because of the [republican] belief
in universalism that republican approaches posit the existence of a
are subjectivity and normativity (or 'ethical situation'), self and other, individual and
society, or particularity and generality." Id. at 33 n.163 (citation omitted). Sunstein
prefers the verb "mediate": "The republican commitment to universalism amounts
to abelief in the possibility of mediating different approaches to politics, or different
conceptions of the public good, through discussion and dialogue." Sunstein, supra
note 2, at 1554. Despite their differences in terminology, both Sunstein and
Michelman are referring to the same characteristic of the civic republican political
process: citizens will come to the process with different perspectives and values, will
encounter during the process the civic republican community's "mediation" or
"reconciliation," and will then leave the process with values that are the same as those
of their fellows. As Sunstein says, "[t]he process of mediation is designed to produce
substantively correct outcomes, understood as such through the ultimate criterion of
agreement among political equals." Id.
150 Michelman, supra note 4, at 33.
131 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 31.
132 See supra note 129.
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common good, to be found at the conclusion of a well-functioning
1 38
deliberative process."
B. Dialogue and Consensus: The Practice
Civic republicanism produces in skeptics the concern that the
deep-seated republican faith in consensus will blind the participants
in political dialogue to the possibility that consensus is not present
or is impossible to achieve. Michelman himself forthrightly states
this concern: "When everyone is civically virtuous, how is it settled
who gives in, if decision is neither by brute voting nor by domination, whether brute or subtle?" 134 Michelman answers this question for himself by reference to the "reconciliatory projects" noted
above, 13 5 along with their associated themes of dialogue, recognition, responsibility, and shared humanity. 136 In a similar vein,
Sunstein answers this concern by relying on his "belief in the
possibility of mediating ... different conceptions of the public
good, through discussion and dialogue."13 7 Although these
statements might reassure those friendly to the civic republican
project, they will provide little solace for skeptics. These statements
amount to little more than assertions of blind faith: faith that there
will be a dialogue in which all members of society can participate
equally; faith that this dialogue will result in an agreement about the
important issues of value in society; 138 and faith that the agreement produced by the process is not a false one-no one is coerced
into agreement against his or her will.
The entire structure of the civic republican system rests on these
expressions of faith. If the expressions of faith are well-founded,
there will be little problem. Indeed, there will be cause for
celebration, for society will have proceeded to the highest level of
harmony imaginable to even the most optimistic political philosopher. But if even one of the civic republicans' expressions of faith
proves false, the civic republican model will produce instead a
governmental system that can only be called totalitarian. It will be
totalitarian because civic republicanism does not incorporate the
133 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
134 Michelman, supra note 4, at 21.
135 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
136 See Michelman, supra note 4, at 33.
137 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
138 If there is no agreement about the important issues,

is a failure and would have to be abandoned.

then civic republicanism
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natural limitations found in pluralist systems. For example, civic
republicans do not share the pluralist's reverence for rights.
Sunstein's position is typical: "Electoral majorities are not permitted to intrude on rights, even if they have good reasons for doing
13 9
so. But the category of rights is a small one."
The dim view civic republicans take of attempts to limit public
power by assigning protection to individual rights reflects the
general republican attitude toward the proper scope of political
power. Civic republicans do not have the suspicions about public
power that are harbored by their pluralist adversaries.
Civic
republicans and pluralists espouse equally conflicting views about
whether moral truth can be determined collectively. Pluralists do
not believe moral truth can be ascertained collectively, 140 whereas
republicans believe that moral truth can be-indeed, can only beascertained through political dialogue. 141 A great deal rides on
this difference. Based solely on their faith in the collective political
body's ability to produce equal, fair, and accurate consensus about
moral truth, civic republicans grant the government a vast amount
of power to coordinate and compile the community's various
14 2
agreements, and then enforce them against everyone in society.
Even more ominously, civic republicans charge the government with
solidifying the community's consensus by cultivating a particular
brand of morality in adults and instilling the same moral principles
in young members of the next generation. A consensus, once
formed, must be protected vigorously. As Sunstein says, "Education
and prevailing morality.., provide the principal lines of defense
" 43
against the dangers of faction. 1

159 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142.

Even a small category of rights may be

inconsistent with the general thrust of the civic republican argument. See infra notes
181-97 and accompanying text.
140 See Michelman, supra note 4, at 21; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.
141 See Michelman, supra note 4, at 27; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
142 The enforcement issue itself raises logical problems for civic republican theory.
If the civic republicans are correct in positing that major community decisions will be
consensual (that is, everyone will agree with the group's decision), then why would
enforcement ever be necessary? Why would a citizen violate a policy with which he
or she agrees?
143 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.
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1. The Problem of Distorted Dialogue and Tainted Consensus
This again raises one of the key questions noted at the beginning of this section. As discussed in the previous section, 144 civic
145
republicans rely on political dialogue to determine moral truths
because they believe that individual preferences unmediated by
political dialogue are likely to be distorted by non-governmental
collective influences. 146 But if individual perceptions of value are
distorted by the influence of collective entities within society, why
do civic republicans view the collective entity known as the
government with less suspicion than private collective entities and
give it broad powers to override the decisions of both individuals
and private collective entities?
One answer to this question is offered by Professor Sunstein:
"[T]he government is uniquely able to undertake a wide range of
tasks, including (for example) the elimination of discrimination, the
regulation of broadcasting, and the protection of the environment.
Tasks of that sort cannot be undertaken entirely by private
actors." 147 But this point is narrower than Sunstein suggests, for
he cites examples of policy preferences that can only be carried out
effectively at the governmental level. Once society decides to divide
collective goods (such as natural resources or broadcast frequencies)
in a particular way, or protect its weak and powerless citizens from
bigots and bullies (for example, through anti-discrimination laws),
those decisions can only be implemented through the government.
No other collective body encompasses the same comprehensive
interests as the government, or has the same power to enforce its
decisions.
It is one thing to note the government's power and efficiency at
carrying out its citizens' policy preferences, and quite another to
argue that the government should be used as an instrument to
define those preferences and instill them in citizens. The efficiency
of government action does not automatically guarantee the morality
or advisability of government action. The question is whether the
144 See supra notes 105-33 and accompanying text.
145 1 use the term "moral truths" as a synonym for what the republican literature
refers to as "civic virtue" or "public values." See supra notes 9-25 and accompanying

text.

146 See Sunstein, supranote 31, at 1133 (stating the necessity for legal intervention
to promote autonomy where current preferences are not autonomous); Sunstein,
supra note 32, at 10 (arguing for democratic interference in certain situations).
147 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1574.
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government can always be trusted to devise policies that are wiser
(i.e., less distorted) than those proposed by private groups and
individuals. The civic republicans clearly feel that governmental
decisions will always be preferable, but Sunstein's first argument
regarding governmental efficiency simply does not speak to this
issue.
A second, more sophisticated response is that the republican
scheme gives governmental decisions priority because government
is more comprehensive than every other form of collective power,
and is therefore more likely to subordinate narrow interests in favor
of the broader interests of society generally. Again, this is a valid
point regarding the government's superior enforcement powers;
society prefers that the government rather than private individuals
enforce public policies because government officers are less
susceptible to favoritism than private enforcers, are less prone to
being bought off by wealthy or powerful interests, and are less likely
to use force for purposes beyond the tasks identified by society's
policymakers. But if the focus is on the issue of defining preferences rather than enforcing them, the civic republican position
becomes more questionable. The civic republicans' comprehensiveness argument is premised on the indisputable observation that
private collective entities represent only a portion of society,
coupled with the disputable presumption that such private collective
entities are only concerned with their own selfish interests. 148 In
the republican view, private collective entities represent Madisonian
149
"factions," rather than truly democratic collective bodies.

148

Professor Sunstein explains:

[M]ultiple threats are posed by private power, including that wielded by
intermediate organizations, which are themselves a source of oppression.
Government must therefore play a role in limiting the powers of such
organizations, without denying the importance of their continued existence.
A system that allowed intermediate organizations to proceed without
regulation would lead to intolerable results.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1574 (citations omitted).
149 Treating all non-governmental groups as inherently fractious is a logical
necessity of the civic republican system, which asserts that power should be shifted
to a collective deliberative body in which everyone is represented equally and (if the
goal of consensus is respected) everyone has a veto over matters of policy.
In this as in other respects, the civic republicans are not consistent. In the civic
republican universe, some groups, like some personal perspectives, are better than
others. As Professor Sunstein notes in the quote cited supra note 148, government
must play a role in limiting the powers of most intermediate organizations. But some
intermediate organizations get preferential treatment. According to Professor
Sunstein, the civic republican government should seek to foster and empower
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Therefore, the republican scheme grants the government power and
deference because only the government can suppress the natural
factional urges of private collective entities and thereby protect the
150
common good.
This conception of virtuous public versus invidious private
collective power is flawed because the civic republicans do not have
an adequate explanation for why the existing private power
intermediate groups that "cultivat[e] ... republican virtues." Id. at 1578. Religious
groups are the common civic republican example of such "good" intermediate groups.
Sunstein proposes weakening the First Amendment's Establishment Clause to permit
religious groups a more active role in public affairs: "[A]pproaches to the clause that
end up disfavoring religion undervalue the role of intermediate organizations in a
pluralistic society." Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Tushnet has made the same
argument: "Citizens must acquire civic responsibility and a concern for the public
interest somewhere," and intermediate organizations such as churches "provide a
sound location for the inculcation of the appropriate balance of values." Mark
Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 735-36 (1986).
It is unclear why religious organizations are given special dispensation among
intermediate groups. Given the large number of social conflicts that can be traced
back to religious differences, it would seem that religious organizations should be one
of the first candidates for exclusion from the political process in a system oriented
toward moral consensus and the elimination of artificial barriers between community
members. Indeed, at one point Sunstein seems to agree with this proposition,
arguing that in the republican system "some issues-religion is a familiar exampleshould be entirely off-limits to politics." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1555. He explains
the apparent inconsistency by arguing that "[m]easures that accommodate religion
may be necessary in order to avoid disfavoring religion through facially neutral
statutes that exclude religious organizations." Id. at 1578 n.214. But the only source
Sunstein cites for this proposition is an article that urges a far broader definition of
"accommodation" than that traditionally used by the Supreme Court to protect
individual practitioners' free exercise of religion. See Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1. The implications of such a broad
view of religious accommodation are highly problematic, and probably incompatible
with the traits that define modern democracies. See generally Steven G. Gey, Why is
ReligionSpecial?: Reconsideringthe Accommodation ofReligion Under the Religion Clauses
of the FirstAmendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75 (1990) (proposing the elimination of the
accommodation principle along with a more narrow definition of religion). I suspect
that the real reason civic republicans seek to revitalize the political power of religion
is that their own system has similar antidemocratic tendencies. Compareid. at 166-87
with infra notes 267-324 and accompanying text. Also, religion may provide the civic
republicans with the "transformative account of personality" thatJefferson Powell has
argued is necessary to achieve the "transformative politics" represented by modern
civic republicanism. See H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J.
1703, 1711 n.47 (1988).
150 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 40-41. Sunstein views Madison's thought as an
amalgam of pluralist and republican tendencies and labels the product of this
amalgamation "Madisonian republicanism." Id. at 47. Sunstein's own brand of "liberal
republicanism" adopts Madison's goals of subordinating faction, but argues that in
order to realize Madisonian goals the government must be permitted to take a more
active, civic republican role in human affairs. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1590.
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relationships will not replicate themselves within the new, republi-

can governmental structure. In their defense, the civic republicans
recognize and attempt to deal with this problem. For example, in
15 1
Professor Sunstein's discussion of proportional representation,
151 Although he hedges his position in various ways, Sunstein argues that
"proportional or group representation may, in some contexts, be a highly desirable
reform.... Distinctly non-Madisonian institutions may be necessary to achieve the
Madisonian goal of deliberative democracy." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1589.
The argument here is that deliberative processes will be improved, not
undermined, if mechanisms are instituted to ensure that multiple groups
have access to the process and are actually present when decisions are made.
Proportional or group representation, precisely by having this effect, would
ensure that diverse views are expressed on an ongoing basis in the
representative process, where they might otherwise be excluded.

Sunstein, supra note 32, at 33. Thus, proportional representation "should facilitate
the healthy expression of collective values or aspirations," because "proportional
representation is designed to increase the likelihood that political outcomes will
incorporate some understanding of all perspectives." Id. at 34.
As with many aspects of civic republican theory, this asserted preference for a
more democratic form of governmental organization expresses a laudable goal, but
has little support from actual experiences with proportional representation schemes.
In Germany's version of the proportional representation system, for example, the two
largest parties rarely obtain a majority in the national government. Both the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union usually have to turn to the
small Free Democratic Party in order to build a majority coalition. See Stephen
Padgett, The Party System, in DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST GERMAN POLITICS 123-30
(Gordon Smith et al. eds., 1989) (discussing the Volkspartei system and the Free
Democratic Party's flexibility and its role in coalition building). Thus, in Germany
proportional representation has two effects: it gives the Free Democrats far more
power than their national vote would otherwise warrant (an anti-democratic effect
contrary to civic republican goals), and it channels political decisions toward the
political center (an effect not unknown in our own Madisonian two-party system). See
RUSSELL J. DALTON, POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 265-66 (1989) (discussing the
influence and the unique political position of the Free Democrats); Christian Soe, The

Free DemocraticParty, in WEST GERMAN POLITICS INTHE MID-EIGHTIES 116-17 (H.G.

Peter Wallach & George K. Romoser eds., 1985) (using a chart to enumerate the
many important ministries held by the FDP from 1949-1983 and noting that the FDP

proportion of Bundestag seats rarely rose above ten percent).
In Israel, proportional representation has the opposite effect: since Labor and
the Likud cannot obtain a consistent political majority, each party has usually turned
to a number of small right-wing, ultra-religious parties to help create a governing
majority. See GREGORY M. LUEBBERT, COMPARATIVE DEMOCRACY: POLICYMAKING AND
GOVERNING COALITIONS IN EUROPE AND ISRAEL 105-46 (1980) (describing Israeli
governments from 1950-1975); KAARE STROM, MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND MAJORITY
RULE 100-02 (1990) (illustrating the comprehensiveness and formalization of
legislative coalitions in Israel). This has produced a number of policies that
antagonize the secular Jews who constitute the overwhelming majority of Israeli
citizens. See STROM, supra, at 101 (noting Labor opposition's characterization of
Likud's concessions to minority religious parties as a "new peak of religious
coercion"). Again, this effect is contrary to the civic republican goal of consensus.
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he notes that "[t]he dangers of factionalism and paralysis threaten
to undermine the political process quite generally." 152 But the
best response the civic republicans can offer to the threat that the
civic republican state will be taken over by powerful members of the
community is their faith that governmental decisions in the civic
republican community will be characterized by the basic republican
commitments of "political equality, deliberation, universalism, and
15 3
citizenship."
2. Environmental Imperfections and Civic Republican Politics
Civic republicanism's own theory of "distorted" preferences casts
doubt on the theory's Panglossian hopefulness about virtuous
government in the republican community. Professor Sunstein has
produced the most comprehensive list of reasons why civic republicans distrust unmediated 54 private preferences.1 55 He argues
Finally, in Italy proportional representation produces governmental stasis,
clientism, and factionalism. See STROM, supra, at 153-54, 160-63 (explaining
politicians' preferences for proportionalism over majoritarianism). These effects, too,
are adverse to the activist goals of civic republicanism.
The effects of proportional representation are very different under all three
systems, but the German, Israeli, and Italian experiences suggest that Sunstein is
wrong to conclude that "proportional representation is designed to increase the
likelihood that political outcomes will incorporate some understanding of the
perspective of all those affected." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1588. In fact, there
seems to be no difference in the treatment of alternative perspectives under the
proportional representation and Madisonian systems. The important perspective is
always the one possessed by the party-or parties-that have power. Other
perspectives are incorporated into governmental policies only to the extent that they
have alternative reservoirs of power (e.g., Democratic Party control of Congress,
which can be leveraged against Republican Party control of the presidency) or can
buy into the coalition that has control of the government. In this respect, as in many
others, civic republicans attempt to avoid the unsavory reality that-to paraphrase'
Henry Clay-the arts of power and its minions are the same under every form of
government. Cf. Henry Clay, Speech in the Senate of the United States, March 14, 1834,
in 2 THE LIFE AND SPEECHES OFTHE HONORABLE HENRY CLAY 196-97 (Daniel Mallory

ed., 1853) ("[T]he arts of power and its minions are the same in all countries and in
all ages. It marks a victim; denounces it; and excites the public odium and the public
hatred, to conceal its own abuses and encroachments. It avails itself of the prejudice
and the passions of the people, silently and secretly to forge chains to enslave the
people.").
152 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1587.

153 Id. at 1590.
15 That is, unmediated by civic republican dialogue. See supra notes 105-10 &
128-32 and accompanying text.
155 See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1140-69 (discussing paternalism and other
situations requiring intervention into personal choices); Sunstein, supra note 32, at
15-27 (outlining cases where welfare and autonomyjustify governmental action which
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that pre-political private preferences are often suspect because they
are the product of environmental imperfections. Unfortunately for
the civic republican project, each of Sunstein's arguments explaining
how private preferences may be distorted and therefore not truly
autonomous apply with equal force to preferences produced by civic
republican political dialogue.
The first imperfection identified by Professor Sunstein has been
discussed above.1 56 This is the notion that "the public, acting
through government, may attempt to bind itself against the
satisfaction of its own misguided choices." 157 The problem here
is that there is no reason to believe that the government can
separate "second-order preferences" from "first-order preferences"
any more accurately than private collective entities or individuals
themselves. Giving the government the power to override the
citizens' "own misguided preferences" is especially problematic if it
is conceded that policies enacted by the civic republican state are
unlikely to be adopted unanimously. This does not bother Sunstein,
who notes that "[a] decision to forbid voluntary foreclosure of
choices through government would be a significant intrusion on
what is by hypothesis the preference of a majority." 158 But if the
civic republican "consensus" to override private preferences really
means only that a majority of the political participants may decide
to override private preferences, 5 9 it is likely that the government'sjudgments about the value of various preferences will simply
reflect the values of the majority that has control of the republican
dialogue.
In this context, governmental decisions about the
preferences of dissenters have no more inherent value than the
decisions of private collective entities, which the civic republicans
openly scorn. Like the private entities whose influence the civic
republicans want to control, the government's decisions will be an
expression of power, not of right or justice.
"subjective welfarism" would condemn).
156 See supra notes 56-88 and accompanying text.
157 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1138.
158 Id. at 1142. For a discussion of Sunstein's majoritarianism, see infranotes 198218 and accompanying text.
159

Of course, this will only occur after the powerful elements in the government

have engaged in the requisite dialogue and created justifications for its action that
appeal to the broader public good. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 83-85 (suggesting
that representatives engage in discussion of appropriate government ends, rather than
responding mechanically to existing private preferences).
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A similar argument can be made with regard to Sunstein's
claims concerning environmental imperfections produced by the
accumulated effect of harmful, long-term consumption patterns.1 60 According to Sunstein, individuals respond to these
imperfections by learning to enjoy consumption patterns that make
them worse off in the long run. Examples of such responses include
addiction, bad habits, and myopic behavior (i.e., decisions to engage
in behavior that produces short-term benefits, in preference to
alternative behavior that would produce far greater long-term
benefits).1 6 1 Sunstein argues that government is permitted to
intervene in such situations if it can be determined that "consumers
are ultimately worse off than they would have been if they had
162
refused to use the addictive substance in the first place."
But like private preferences to use addictive substances, the
political decision to prohibit the use of addictive substances is
premised on value-laden decisions about what constitutes "an
undesirable addiction." 163 To Sunstein, consumption of alcohol
is undesirable because the "subjective benefits of consumption
decrease sharply over time"16 4 , while consumption of classical
music is desirable because "[t]he more one consumes, the greater
the benefits to the consumer; use continues or increases not
because of the pain of withdrawal but because of the pleasure of
consumption." 165 I suspect the average fan of Budweiser and
Guns n' Roses might disagree. The point is, if one set of preferences
is distorted, so is the other. The fact that the government decides
to endorse one set of preferences means only that political power
16 6
has been mustered in favor of some values and against others.
A third environmental imperfection cited by Sunstein is the
absence of adequate information about certain private preferences.1 67 According to Sunstein, this is his least controversial argument for interfering with consumption choices.1 68 No one would
dispute that a decision is distorted if it is made without considering
160 See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1158-66; Sunstein, supra note 32, at 24-27.
161
162
163
164

See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 24-27.
Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1159.
Id. at 1160.
Id.
165 id.
'66 The implication of Sunstein's arguments for civil liberties in general will be
explored in the next section. See infra notes 181-272 and accompanying text.

167 See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1166-69 (outlining governmental responses to
imperfect information and other cognitive distortions).
68 Id. at 1166.
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significant relevant information about the consequences of that
decision. But the proper response to this imperfection is the
provision of the missing information, with the expectation that if
individuals know the risks and advantages of their behavior, their
decision to take certain risks should be respected. However,
Sunstein is not satisfied with the government simply providing
missing information. Rather, he would permit the government to
ban behavior in certain circumstances on the ground that "informed
169
people would not engage in the transaction."
Sunstein's argument that the government should be permitted
to ban certain behavior is premised partly on the expense of
providing the necessary information, but also on a distrust of the
citizens who are engaging in behavior based on that information.
Some information is just too complex for citizens to assimilate, and
other information is subject to the "phenomenon of irrationally
discounting low-probability events." 170 But as Sunstein himself
acknowledges, "[w]hat appears to be an irrational evaluation of a
danger may in fact be a subjective attraction to risk, a preference
that should not be interfered with if there is no independent basis
for concern."

171

This sounds appropriately respectful of an individual's own
perceptions and desires until one reads the footnote to the abovequoted passage, which states that "[t]he candidates for that
independent basis include paternalism and cognitive distortions." 172 In other words, the problem is not inadequate information, but irrational and irresponsible individuals who just don't
know what is good for them. As in determinations regarding the
social value of classical music, there is no reason to believe that a
collection of individuals who control the government will necessarily
value risk more appropriately than individuals who want to engage
in risky behavior. Depending on an individual's perspective, one
risk valuation may be just as distorted as another. For example,
notifying citizens of the dangers of cigarette smoking is a perfectly
appropriate governmental action; but banning smoking because the
citizens do not respond to that information by quitting on their own
173
is an inappropriate governmental intrusion into personal affairs.

169

Id. at 1166-67.

170 Id. at 1168.

Id. at 1168-69.
Id. at 1169 n.141.
173 Professor Sunstein is ambivalent about government bans on smoking. Compare
171

172
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The final environmental imperfection cited by Sunstein is the
"socially produced absence of sufficient opportunities." 174 This
imperfection takes the form of economic limitations arising from
poverty, or overt discrimination against members of a disfavored
race or gender. Individuals respond to these environmental
imperfections by "reflexively adapt[ing] to unjust background
conditions." 175 Stated differently, they lower their expectations to
conform to the limited opportunities presented to them by the
environment. Also, Sunstein argues that the victims of such
environmental imperfections take on the ideological coloration of
their surroundings to reduce cognitive dissonance: "People may
become content with the status quo, even a status quo in which they
176
are oppressed, because they believe that it cannot be changed."
As with the other forms of environmental distortions discussed
above, Sunstein argues in favor of government intervention to alter
what he perceives to be the common ideological responses to class,
race, and gender imperfections. But once again he minimizes the
extent to which the political process will produce its own distortions, and as a result he grants the government virtually unbounded
power to change not only physical social conditions, but also the
ideology, beliefs, and preferences of those participating in the
political process. Like Professor Sunstein, I would argue in favor of
strong wealth redistribution and anti-discrimination legislation. But
as I will argue in the final section of this article, 177 such legislaSunstein, supra note 31, at 1163 (observing the unlikelihood that a consensus could
be formed to ban smoking) with Sunstein, supra note 32, at 27 (noting the possibility
of "democratic restrictions on smoking cigarettes"). Another example would be AIDS
information. Although government provision of information about the transmission
of AIDS is unobjectionable, a government ban on homosexual sex is clearly an
unwarranted intrusion into personal autonomy.
This is not to say that all government efforts to correct behavior resulting from
inadequate information are inappropriate. For example, Sunstein cites implied
warranties of habitability as one permissible governmental response to the lack of
consumer information about the state of rental housing. See Sunstein, supra note 31,
at 1168 (pointing out that tenants may irrationally discount the probability of nonhabitability). But this legislation isjustified more broadly by the general governmental concern that all citizens be housed safely, and the equally broad concern that
tenants be protected against the use of unequal bargaining power by landlords in
scarce rental markets.
174 Sunstein, supranote 32, at 21 n.18; see also Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1145-58
(discussing cognitive defects of various preferences and the possibility forjudicial and
legislative intervention).
175 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 21.
176 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1154.
17 7
See infra notes 273-332 and accompanying text.
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tion can be-indeed, must be if democratic principles are followedjustified on grounds that leave individual citizens a large measure
and
of personal autonomy, which the citizens may use to dissent
178
objectives.
stated
government's
even agitate against the
Arguments supporting government action in the areas of
economic redistribution and anti-discrimination do not transfer well
to issues relating to belief, expression, and ideology because control
Indeed, I would argue that it was precisely this protection of dissent and
agitation that produced the anti-discrimination policies that Sunstein uses as the
model for his republican political structure.
Sunstein argues that recent progress in the area of civil rights is an example of
a situation in which "relations of power, incapable of rational defense, have been
revealed as such through public dialogue." Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1155.
But I would offer an alternative explanation: civil rights progress has more to
do with fractious conflict than with republican dialogue and consensus. Prior to the
late sixties, the civil rights movement was almost entirely a movement of outsiders to
the political process. And to the extent that political insiders sympathized with the
civil rights movement enough to push through important legislation such as the 1964
Civil Rights Act, they did so only over the strenuous opposition of conservative
republicans and southern democrats. The process leading to the enactment of this
legislation did not fit the republican model of dialogue and consensus at all. To the
contrary, the supporters of civil rights legislation simply mustered their political
power and shoved the legislation down the throats of their recalcitrant opponents.
178

See generally ROBERT D. LOEVY, To END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE

PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 passim (1990) (discussing the long,
arduous process of passing the Civil Rights Act through Congress); CHARLES &
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT passim (1985) (documenting the history of civil rights legislation
and the actors involved). To the extent that the government got involved prior to this
bit of congressional and presidential muscle flexing, it was the courts, rather than the
elected branches, that provided the strongest support for civil rights. Like the
subsequent fight over civil rights legislation, the judicial involvement during the fifties
and sixties, starting with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), did not
fit the civic republican model of government action through dialogue and consensus.
The courts took the cases, issued their decisions and then enforced them to the hilt,
usually against the strong opposition of elected officials throughout the south. See
JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 22 (1981) (discussing the innovative and creative
responses by the Fifth Circuit to the void left by the Supreme Court's desegregation
decisions);J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 134 (1971) (praising the actions
ofjudges in desegregation relative to Congress, the President, and state legislatures).
The courts' refusal to engage in a dialogue with segregationist political actors during
this period was most bluntly stated in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Cooper,
the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the legal relevance of political opinion
within Arkansas by concluding curtly that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution." Id. at 18.
Our modern understanding and sympathy for civil rights has less to do with
"relations of power ...revealed as such through public dialogue," Sunstein, supra
note 31, at 1155, than with society's retroactive endorsement of the stubborn,
antagonistic, and brave behavior of men and women who were outside the political
mainstream in their own time.
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of the latter facets of human behavior requires a far more prescient
and infallible government than has ever been created. Economic
and social legislation are to a large extent utilitarian in nature. In
considering questions of redistribution and social welfare, government actors must consider not only fairness, but also effectiveness.
The substantial empirical component presented by such issues
forces the government to address problems with a certain degree of
modesty with regard to both means and ends. Experienced
legislators know that no statute will change the world, and that all
solutions are imperfect and temporary. Times and problems
change, and so do legislative responses to those problems. It is a
far different matter for the government to define some celestial
concept such as "civic virtue," and attempt to instill the various
aspects of "virtue" in the citizenry. Members of a government who
are told that they have this power will think of government in far
more totalistic, if not totalitarian terms. This is not something
members of a democracy should want to encourage.
This raises one last time the question posed at the beginning of
this section: How is it that civic republicans believe the members
of the new republican government are capable of such feats of
moral projection? What convinces civic republicans that their new,
virtuous legislators will succeed where every other government in
history has failed: the elimination of conflict from the political
arena? The civic republicans seem to rely on nothing more than
faith, or as Sunstein puts it, an "extremely optimistic [understanding] about the effects of public deliberation." 179 Those of us who
lack faith in the perfectibility of political animals see a much darker
picture. This picture sees a civic republican politics that is different
from what presently exists only in that the proposed regime justifies
itself in much more grandiose terms. We skeptics see in republican
claims of "civic virtue" a dangerous tendency to believe their own
absolutist claims that "some perspectives are better than others, and
that that claim can be vindicated through discussion." 180 The
question is, what will happen to those who don't see the republican
light? The next section pursues this question in the context of civic
republican arguments on matters relating to traditional civil
liberties.

Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1155.
180 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1574.
179
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III. THE COMMUNITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CIVIC REPUBLICANS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
Like so much of civic republican theory, the republican
approach to rights is imprecise.
Statements about rights by
proponents of modern civic republicanism are ambivalent and even
contradictory. On one hand modern civic republicans state a very
liberal distrust of a powerful government. Professor Sunstein, in
particular, attempts to graft these liberal tendencies onto an
updated version of republicanism. Thus, "liberal republicans are
fearful of public power, and impose numerous constraints on the
operation of the public sphere." 1 8 1
Likewise, "[r]epublican
theories are not.., hostile to the protection of individual or group
autonomy from state control." 182 At first glance, statements such
as these seem like a major concession to the liberal argument that
the potentially oppressive power of the community must be limited
by some specific institutional constraints. These constraints would
place matters within the category denominated "rights" off-limits to
the government.
Having acknowledged the necessity of institutional constraints,
and thus the need for "rights," Professor Sunstein then provides an
odd definition of civic republican "rights." In the civic republican
system, he says, "[bloth private rights and institutional arrangements
are understood... as the outcome of a well-functioning deliberative
process." 183 Sunstein elaborates on this notion later in the same
article:
Republicans do of course believe in rights, understood as the
outcome of a well-functioning deliberative process; hence republicans enthusiastically endorse the use of constitutionalism as a
check on popular majorities. But republicans are skeptical of

approaches to politics and constitutionalism that rely on rights
8 4
that are said to antedate political deliberation.
The implications of these statements are unclear. What does
Sunstein mean when he endorses constitutional limits on political
action, then expresses skepticism about rights that "antedate
political deliberation?" The last quote appears in a discussion
18s5
critical of the natural rights component of Lochner v. New York.
181 Id. at 1569.
182 Id. at 1551.
183 Id. at 1569.

184 Id. at 1579-80.
185 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that state labor laws regarding limits on working
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Thus Sunstein may simply be arguing that republican politics is
hostile to conceptions of rights that are presumed to be ordained by
some higher power, and therefore placed beyond human control. 186

But if this is the case, the republican conception of

politics is indistinguishable from most modern liberal systems,
which also eschew celestial determination of human political
entitlements, but nevertheless are willing to constitutionally insulate
certain aspects of human behavior from the direct control of
political majorities.
I believe Sunstein's skepticism about rights extends far beyond
a limited critique of traditional natural rights jurisprudence, and in
fact casts doubt on many, if not most modern constitutional rights.
Sunstein's words can certainly support such an interpretation. After
all, in one sense all constitutional limitations that have been in
effect for more than a generation (for example, the Bill of Rights)
rely on rights that antedate present political deliberation. Furthermore, as a matter of theoretical consistency, it is understandable
that a civic republican would be skeptical about the impact of
strongly enforced constitutional limitations, because the Constitution's demarcation of rights sharply limits the political dialogue that
is the centerpiece of the republican political scheme.
When Sunstein says that "[o]n the republican point of view, the
existence of realms of private autonomy must be justified in public
terms,"18 7 he seems to mean that individual rights exist only when
they coincide with the public values developed and enforced by the
hours are unconstitutional intrusions on the liberty of individuals).
186 The natural law strain of the American constitutional tradition, on which
Lochner draws, has roots that extend back to the period prior to the revolution. See
BAILYN, supra note 1, at 55-93, 175-98 (discussing pre-revolutionary ideas of power
and liberty, including "natural rights"). The earliest articulation of this theme in the
Supreme Court's constitutionajurisprudence can be found injustice Chase's opinion
in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). Justice Chase argued that "[t]he purposes for
which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social
compact.... The nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it."
Id. at 388. According to Chase, a law impairing private contracts "is against all reason
andjustice, for a people to intrust [sic] a legislature with such powers; and therefore,
it cannot be presumed that they have done it." Id. In the second half of the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court expanded the list of private economic
activities protected by "reason andjustice" from popular legislative control. See, e.g.,
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) ("The liberty mentioned in [the
Fourteenth Amendment]... is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways... to
pursue any livelihood or avocation .... "). This in turn led directly to twentieth
century applications of this theory in cases like Lochner.
187 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1551.
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government. "What is distinctive about the republican view is that
it understands most rights as either the preconditions for or the
outcome of an undistorted deliberative process." l8 8 By giving the
political community the power to define "an undistorted deliberative process," Sunstein simultaneously gives the community the
power to reinterpret the meaning of "rights." Thus, for example,
189
although Sunstein concedes the need for some free expression,
apparently he would eliminate constitutional protection for
expression that does not fit within his conception of public virtuemost notably, pornography. 90
Unfortunately, if the political
community has the power to define for itself the meaning of the
rights it must respect, then the government has power to define its
own limitations. If this is what "rights" means in the civic republican scheme, the word has lost all meaning.
Sunstein comes close to conceding this point explicitly. He
acknowledges that in a republican system "the category of rights is
a small one." 191 At the same time, however, he insists that "[e]lectoral majorities are not permitted to intrude on rights, even if they
have good reasons for doing so. " 192 This insistence reflects
Sunstein's understandable discomfort with the unbounded power of
a civic republican government, but as a theoretical matter even a
small category of rights is inconsistent with the central themes of
civic republican theory.
Sunstein states other reservations about the permissible scope
of legislation in a civic republican state that are equally inconsistent
with the overall thrust of the civic republican scheme. For example,
he argues that "rights fundamental to autonomy or welfareconsider consensual sexual activity-ought generally to be off-limits
to government." 193 He also argues that laws against racial intermarriage should not be respected. 194 But the reasons Sunstein
188 Id.
189 See

id.

190 See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornographyand the FirstAmendmen 1986 DuKE L.J. 589.
This article is discussed at infra notes 229-44 and accompanying text.
191 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142.
192

Id.

193 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 19. See also Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142 n.54
("[E]ven ifa majority is seeking to bind itself, it may not be able to do so because this
may interfere with a right of personal autonomy on the part of a minority.").
94 See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1143 ("A second-order preference against racial
intermarriage.., should not be respected ....
"); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 19 ("A
collective judgment that racial intermarriage is intolerable could not plausibly be
justified even if it is said to reflect a collective social aspiration.").
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offers for these restrictions on civic republican government are
inconsistent with the broad powers he grants the community to
define itself through political deliberation. For example, he says in
one article that "a substantive argument, derived from the Constitution or political theory, may rule out some such [collectively
determined] preferences," 195 and in another article that "the
collective judgment must not be objectionable on moral
grounds." 196 But Sunstein's reference to "moral grounds" and
"political theory" is an attempt to go outside the political system to
define collective values, which conflicts directly with the republican
reliance on determining values through political dialogue and
consensus. These references to external morality put him in the
position of doing exactly what he criticizes the Lochner Court for
doing: "posit[ing] the existence of a natural and prepolitical
private
19 7
sphere, one that served as a brake on legislation."
I sympathize with Professor Sunstein's efforts to ensure that the
community's government will not simply enact its popular prejudices into law under the aegis of articulating public values. But these
efforts cannot succeed within the confines of Sunstein's system.
The tenets of civic republican theory deny Professor Sunstein access
to any significant theoretical limitations on governmental power. By
attempting to impose a priori limitations on civic republican
legislation regarding interracial marriage or consensual sexual
activity, Sunstein violates the precepts of his theory and simultaneously reveals his own insecurity about whether an unfettered civic
republican dialogue can be trusted to produce a set of public values
that are just and fair.

195 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1143.
196 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 19.
197 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1579. He is also violating his own rule against
treating any value as exogenous. Sunstein's focus on "the phenomenon of
endogenous preferences," Sunstein, supra note 32, at 5, tells us that all preferences
are endogenous; that is, they "are not fixed and stable, but are instead adaptive to a
wide range of factors." Id. Since Sunstein gives us no reason to distinguish
preferences based on "moral grounds" or "political theory" from other preferences,
they must be endogenous as well, and therefore deserve "at most presumptive
respect" from the civic republican community's government. See Sunstein, supra note
31, at 1133.
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A. The Latent Majoritarianismof Civic Republican Politics
Professor Sunstein's doubts about the trustworthiness of the
republican system are amply justified. Within the civic republican
system, Sunstein must rely on dialogue and consensus alone to
protect civil liberties. He even contends that public values such as
"liberty" cannot be defined outside the context of governmental
dialogue. 198 Thus, political decisions made by a republican state
that implicate civil liberties magnify the problems with "consensus"
mentioned previously. 199 A brief reconsideration of the central
republican concept of consensus in light of the actual operation of
the civic republican political process will underscore the point that
civil liberties seem to rest on very precarious ground in a republican
system.
I have already mentioned the difficulty of translating the
classical "small-town-community-meeting" model of politics into the
modern political context.2 00 One manifestation of this difficulty
is the need to revise the means by which the republican community
finalizes its decisions in the modern era. The classical model uses
terms like "dialogue" and "consensus" in an ordinary, non-specialized way. "Dialogue" in the classical republican political community
means the same thing as in ordinary conversation:
specific
individuals talking to one another about a particular issue.
"Consensus" also conveys its ordinary meaning: the same specific
individuals who have discussed an issue reach some accord about
their future collective action.
Thus, even where the group's members do not unanimously

adopt the point of view that the group has chosen the wisest option
for future action, the classical notion of "consensus" reflects the
face-to-face context in which the decision is made. This context will
provide an opportunity for members who wholeheartedly support
the group's decision personally to allay the reservations of the more
reluctant members, and will also provide the opportunity for
victorious group members to assure the losers in the political
dialogue that their views are still important. The trust and personal
knowledge which accumulates from the daily interactions of a small
community will ensure that even if the community's political
decisions are not unanimous, the "consensus" is genuine. Each
198 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 105-80 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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member of the community will have confidence in his or her friends
and neighbors. Therefore, a community member who does not
support the community's policy in the abstract will have good
reason to support the community's decision as applied by his or her
friends and neighbors. The citizen's trust in other individual
community members will be transferred to trust in the decisions
20 1
made by those individuals.
However, if the concepts of "dialogue" and "consensus" are
removed from the context of a small, close-knit community, in
which everyone knows everyone else, the terms take on a much
more specialized and abstract meaning. "Dialogue" is transformed
from a conversation among specific individuals into an exchange
between representatives of groups of individuals. 20 2 "Consensus"
likewise loses its overtones of genuine accord among citizens who
know and trust each other. In an anonymous political society (that
is, a society in which citizens do not know every other participant
personally in the political process), it is impossible to cultivate
agreement premised on personal trust. Thus, policy disagreements
cannot be subsumed within a larger context of good will and mutual
respect.
One possible civic republican response to this problem is to
interpret "consensus" as "unanimity." In other words, the civic
republicans could argue that the government would only be
permitted to use its extensive powers to cultivate and enforce public
values when every member of society actually agreed (through a
201 This is, of course, an extremely uncritical and perhaps even credulous account
of the classical model. It does not take into account the argument that the classical
model glosses over the disparities and inequities of power present in even the smallest
community. It also discounts the stifling pressure to conform, which characterizes
many small, homogeneous communities-especially communities that take an active
interest in developing proper moral beliefs and attitudes among all community
members. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245-46 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part) (discussing pressure to conform in Amish communities). Thus, it
could be argued that the classical model is itself potentially demagogic, empirically
flawed, and unworkable, even if considered in light of a hypothetical preindustrial
factual situation. However, the flaws of the classical model are not my concern here.
Whatever historical relevance the classical model may have, the differences between
the classical town-meeting model and modern political structures are so numerous
that almost none of the assumptions supporting the classical republican model can
be applied to the modern version. Thus, if the classical model of republican politics
can be criticized as utopian, the modern version can be criticized as both utopian and
anachronistic.
202 Sunstein's recognition of this transformation explains his advocacy of political

reforms based on proportional or group representation. See Sunstein, supra note 2,
at 1585-89; Sunstein, supra note 32, at 32-34.
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referendum or some equivalent indicator) upon the particular values
at issue. Of course, this response would render civic republicanism
useless as a guide to government action. In a community of any
substantial size, there will always be disagreement about values and
policies.
If the mechanism for legitimating government action is not
community unanimity, however, then the only other possible civic
republican response to the problem of modern political decisionmaking is to propose a system of majority rule. 20 3 Although
Sunstein does not discuss the issue in detail, this is obviously the
response he favors. 20 4 For example, he acknowledges that there
probably will be dissenters to political outcomes reached by even a
well-functioning modern republican state, and that there is nothing
wrong with the government in such a state forcing these dissenters
to go along with the views of the political majority. 20 5 Objections
203 This raises the question whether our present majoritarian system is republican.
The answer to this question is "no." "Modern republicans do not claim that existing
systems actually embody republican deliberation." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1549.
It is not altogether clear what changes must occur to correct the current system's
imperfections. "Large questions-having to do with the appropriate conception of
rights, institutions, and groups-remain to be resolved." Id. at 1576.
204 Only two limitations on majority rule are evident in civic republican writings.
First, before enacting legislation the political participants must engage in a proper
republican dialogue. This means that they must distance themselves from their own
parochial interests, "think from the point of view of everybody," Sunstein, supra note
2, at 1570, and likewise "achieve a measure of critical distance from prevailing desires
and practices, subjecting these desires and practices to scrutiny and review," id. at
1548-49. Second, the political participants must "appeal to a broader public good"
rather than private interests to justify their policies. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 83.
A cynic might suggest that these requirements do not effectively limit anything
a civic republican majority might want to do, since the existence of an appropriate
dialogue and "a broader public good" is judged by the victorious participants
themselves. If the participants in the process all behave according to republican
principles, they will inevitably believe that their deliberations are "well-functioning,"
because if they believed otherwise they would have altered the structure of the
deliberations. Therefore, deliberations carried to conclusion (i.e., an agreement
among the majority) will inevitably produce an outcome that represents the "broader
public good," since civic republican theorists view agreement as a "regulative ideal"
and "posit the existence of a common good, to be found at the conclusion of a wellfunctioning deliberative process." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554. The system's selfjustification mechanism is impregnable.
The dark underside of this equation is that a republican majority that sincerely
believes Sunstein's proposition that dialogue will produce "substantively right
answers," see id. at 1541, will also logically treat dissent as substantively wrong. And
if the majority knows that dissenting ideas are substantively wrong, why permit people
to express those ideas?
205 See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142; Sunstein, supra note 32, at 18.
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to this principle on civil libertarian grounds are rejected because
they rely on the presumption (rejected by civic republicans 20 6)
that the dissenters' unreconstructed and unmediated preferences
should be respected. Sunstein notes that some non-republican
systems would give more weight to the views of dissenters. "The
weaknesses of a majority, it might be thought, are an insufficient
reason to bar a minority from doing something that it wants to
do."20 7 But the republican system has no such problems with the
rights of individuals who resist the moral improvement mandated
by the majority. "The foreclosure of the preferences of a minority
is unfortunate," 20 8 Sunstein writes. Nevertheless, he sees no way
around such a foreclosure in a proper republican state. "If the
majority is prohibited from vindicating its second-order preferences
through legislation, its own desires will be frustrated; the choice is
between the preferences of the majority and those of the minority.-209

This conclusion follows from the republican belief in "the
existence of a common good, to be found at the end of a wellfunctioning deliberative process." 2 10 But this conclusion also
reveals the potentially totalitarian overtones of civic republican
thought. The civic republican system begins with the presumption
that a "well-functioning deliberative process" will produce an
accurate determination of the "common good," and then adds the
recognition that a "well-functioning deliberative process" need not
rely on unanimity, but can be majoritarian in character. From these
two premises it is a short step to the conclusion that the victors in
the republican political arena are not obligated to respect the views
of the dissenters. This casts Sunstein's dry assertion that "the
category of rights is a small one" 21 1 in a more foreboding light.
Indeed, under the logic of the civic republican system, the category
of rights should not exist at all.
Of course, every democratic system grants the political majority
control over many areas of life. And in the areas ceded to majority
control, democratic majorities can and should take Sunstein's
attitude toward the losers in a political battle. In this situation the
206 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.

Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142.
208 Id.
2
09 Id.
210 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
207

211

Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142.
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minority's preferences are subordinated because, and only because,
they are the minority. In a democracy, the minority is forced to
take a certain number of lumps.
The difference between civic republican theory and other
democratic schemes is that non-republican schemes incorporate a
greater skepticism about the moral superiority of majoritarian
decisions. Non-republican democratic theories do not interpret the
majority's decision as anything more than an expression of power.
The expression of power is legitimate because a democratic system
gives the political majority the right to do what it wants most of the
time, on the theory that premising political legitimacy on sheer
numbers is a more equitable basis for government than premising
political legitimacy on the economic or military power of an elite
minority. Even so, non-republican theories are not naive about the
abilities of democratic majorities. This is why non-republican
democratic theory attempts to remove certain types of decisions
from the immediate control of the political majority.2 1 2 To a nonrepublican democratic theorist, the concept of "rights" is a
necessary response to an inevitably imperfect political process.
Rights are the practical embodiment of the non-republican
recognition that people who have power are always fallible and
usually self-interested, even if they belong to a clear majority in
society.
In contrast to non-republicans, civic republicans are much more
willing to extend political control-which, as we have seen, means
majoritarian control-into areas of individual ideology, beliefs,
attitudes, and private consensual behavior. 213
Government
212 Most democratic theories also contain a melancholy recognition that no issue
in a democratic society can be removed from democratic control completely or
forever. If a majority of citizens can muster the necessary political strength to
abandon the notion of constitutional rights entirely, they can do so by rewriting the
constitution and abrogating the Bill of Rights. The majority could likewise replace
the current secular limited democracy with a plutocracy, a theocracy, or an outright
dictatorship. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, if the beliefs expressed in totalitarian
theories are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the
only meaning of democracy is that they should be given their chance and have their
way. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(discussing "the only meaning of free speech"). The debate between republicans and
non-republicans concerns which institutions and presumptions are best able to
preserve a vital democracy. As I explain below, democratic principles are fostered
best by institutions and presumptions that inhibit political majorities from exercising
their ultimate prerogatives over matters central to personal autonomy. See infra notes
273-332 and accompanying text.
213 Sexual activity is the most obvious example of what I call "private consensual
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intervention into these areas of otherwise private concern actually
seems required by the republican concept of civic virtue and the
complementary republican assertion that unmediated private
preferences tend to be distorted by non-governmental social factors.
But when civic republican consensus is revealed as a function of
majority rule,2 14 government interference with the aspects of
individual behavior noted above becomes much harder to justify.
Such government interference is even more problematic if one of
the government's roles is to teach civic virtue and to regulate,
control, and "undistort" preferences that the republican majority
2 15
finds substantively incorrect.
The key question confronting modern republican majorities is
the same one that vexed the classical civic republicans. As Professor
Sherry notes, "[i]n locating the authority of government in the
governed, republicanism created another dilemma: what would
move an uncoerced citizenry to obey?" 216 Sherry answers this
concern by quoting Stanley Katz's description of the classical
republican answer: "The republican conundrum was thus how to
change the flow of authority, from top-down to bottom-up; the
2 17
republican solution was that obedience must be internalized."
behavior," but Sunstein also notes with favor arguments supporting social regulation
of other harmful habits, such as cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption. See
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 25-27. In another article he expresses doubts that a
consensus could be mustered in support of prohibition of smoking or consumption
of alcohol. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1163. By phrasing his hesitation this way,
however, Sunstein implies that if a consensus (that is, a republican majority) ever did
form to prohibit "bad" habits such as these, the government would not be foreclosed
from enforcing such laws on members of society who insist on engaging in these
minor vices.
214 See supra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
215 If the republican majority views the political process as "well-functioning," it
will view its decisions as substantively correct. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1541,
1554 ("The process of mediation is designed to produce substantively correct
outcomes, understood as such through the ultimate criterion of agreement among
political equals."). Conversely, the majority will also perceive dissenting views as
substantively incorrect. These substantively incorrect views will be subject to
government regulation and control "precisely in the interest of welfare and
autonomy." Sunstein, supra note 32, at 13.
216 Sherry, supra note 10, at 556; Michaelman also asks:
Is deliberation a magic guaranteed to create an authentic consensus? If not,

does civic virtue in the end really mean giving in, exchanging your
convictions for your civic friend's after you have all deliberated to impasse?
When everyone is civically virtuous, how is it settled who gives in, if decision
is neither by brute voting nor by domination, whether brute or subtle?
Michelman, supra note 4, at 21.
217 Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionaty

864

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 141:801

Professor Sunstein seems to have the same answer in mind when he
refers to the primary role played by education in the republican
218
state.
But the modern civic republicans do not recognize the irony
suggested by their answer to the dilemma of dissent and compliance
within the republican society. If the citizenry is intended to
"internalize obedience," how is the power supposed to flow from
the bottom up? If the civic republican state works as planned,
contrary ideas of the common good will be eradicated (by, among
other things, an effective and overtly value-laden system of public
education) long before citizens are old enough to become involved
in politics. By the time the well-trained young citizen reaches the
age of political involvement, he or she will only be able to tell those
at the top exactly what those at the top want to hear. The only way
this self-perpetuating system can be broken is if those at the top are
not permitted to develop totally effective means of inculcating the
"correct" way of thinking among the populace. The civic republican
goal of cultivating civic virtue is at odds with its goal of "chang[ing]
219
the flow of authority, from top-down to bottom-up."
As a practical matter, this may be a moot issue. Many governments throughout history have found human beings distressingly
resistant to governmental insistence that citizens should "internalize
obedience" to the regime's definition of the common good. The
would-be rulers of a civic republican state can be expected to fare
no better than the rulers of other, equally "virtuous" governments
who went before them. But the stance taken by civic republicans
toward rights and civil liberties reveals a great deal concerning their
attitudes about power and its appropriate uses. After discussing a
few specific examples of the republican approach to civil liberties,
I will return to this issue and consider whether the republican
approach to power undermines its appeal as a democratic theory.

America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 482 (1976), quoted in Sherry, supra note 10, at 556.
218 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32 ("Education and prevailing morality ...
provide the principal lines of defense against the dangers of faction.").
219 Katz, supra note 217, at 482.

1993]

CIVIC REPUBLICANISM

B. A Brief Example of the Republican Approach to Civil
Liberties: Alternative Sexual Expression and Conduct
Civic republicans are an elusive breed. When considered at the
highest level of generality, their theory is almost unassailable. In
the abstract it is hard to argue against the values of virtue, dialogue,
and consensus in government, regardless of one's theoretical
approach to political culture. But these terms are very broad, and
are susceptible to very different meanings in application. Also,
details about the application of these terms are often hard to find
amidst the abstractions of republican doctrine. As Professor
Sunstein admits, "[1large questions-having to do with the appropriate conception of rights, institutions, and groups-remain to be
resolved." 22 0 Unfortunately, since political theory concerns itself
almost exclusively with conceptions of rights, institutions, and
groups, this disclaimer indicates that not much has been resolved by
modern civic republican theory. This is hard on those of us who are
not yet sold on the theory. The amorphous nature of modern civic
republicanism forces non-adherents to resort to deduction and
speculation to fill in the gaps regarding the theory's implications in
the real world.
The indefinite nature of republican theory extends to the area
of constitutional rights and civil liberties. We do not know how
prominent republicans would approach many aspects of these issues
because there is almost no discussion of particular applications of
central republican principles. It would be interesting to know, for
example, how civic republicans would approach the area of
constitutional criminal procedure. Since most republican theorists
position themselves on the political left, it would be plausible to
expect that republicans would take a traditional libertarian attitudehighly favorable to defendants' rights, and hostile to substantially
increased police power. Although this is the initial implication of
republican thought, I am not sure that it is altogether consistent
with their benign view of the state and its heightened role in
enforcing the republican community's values. It may be that
republican doctrine would diverge from traditional liberalism's
strong protection of criminal defendants on the ground that the
community should be given greater leeway to enforce its virtuous
attitudes against recalcitrant individuals who threaten to break down
221
the bonds of the community.
220 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1576.
221 For example, the republican emphasis on community solidarity might lead a
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The one area of civil liberties litigation that civic republicans
discuss in some detail involves the First Amendment right to free
expression. As in other aspects of the theory, the civic republicans'
general statements on the subject are comforting. According to
Sunstein, "liberty of expression and conscience" are among the
"basic preconditions for republican deliberation." 222 But when
the republicans occasionally delve into the details of First Amendment jurisprudence, they reveal a very different, far more circumscribed approach toward the protection of free expression. This
attitude tends to confirm the suspicion that civic republican theory
is far more illiberal than Sunstein's comforting assurances about a
synthesized "liberal republicanism" might suggest. 225
Hints of republicanism's illiberal attitude are scattered throughout republican discussions of First Amendment issues. Some of
these hints are so indirect that they easily escape notice. Sunstein,
for example, uses a free speech matter to illustrate his theory that
members of the political majority in a republican state are authorized to bind themselves legally to their second-order preferences
(that is, to their higher desires and aspirations), even when this selfbinding codification intrudes on the first-order preferences of a
morally indolent minority. Sunstein uses government regulation of
television programming to illustrate this principle. "Suppose ...

civic republican theorist to identify with efforts by victim's rights advocates to limit
defendant's rights in criminal trials and permit evidence of the victim's harm tojustify
increasing the severity of criminal punishment. It would be logical for a civic
republican to agree with Justice Scalia that criminal courts and juries should "take
into account in their sentencing decisions not only the factors mitigating the
defendant's moral guilt, but also the amount of harm he has caused to innocent
members of society." Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Likewise, republicans logicallywould be more congenial than traditional liberals
to retributive justifications of criminal punishment. That is, civic republicans might
be willing to justify punishment for its own sake, even in the absence of proof that
the punishment will serve some utilitarian purpose such as deterrence of future
crime. Retribution is premised on notions of organic community similar to those
offered by civic republicanism. The civic republican is likely to identify strongly with
retributive arguments that the criminal has in essence "willed his own punishment"
by participating in society and accepting the benefits of society's rules. SeeJEFFRIE G.
MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 100 (1979). The implications of
retributive arguments cannot be explored fully here, but they are potentially
repressive, especially when applied to areas such as capital punishment. See Steven
G. Gey,Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67 (1992). At the very
least, the conjunction of retributive and republican arguments should be troublesome
for civic republican proponents.
222 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1551.
223 See id. at 1566-71.
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that a majority wants to require high-quality television and to ban
violent and dehumanizing shows, but that a significant minority
wants to see the latter."2 24 Sunstein's answer, of course, is that
the high-minded members of the majority may bind the entire
society to their preferred type of televisi6n, regardless of the desires
of the low-minded minority. 225 My concern is with the following
parenthetical that Sunstein includes in his discussion: "I put the
First Amendment questions to one side." 226 My point is this: the
fact that some members of society want to view programming that
the political majority does not want them to see is the First
Amendment question. By treating this hypothetical problem as if
it could be answered without implicating the First Amendment tells
us something significant about Sunstein's views on the subject of
free expression.
A bit later in the same article, Sunstein reveals why he is able to
dismiss First Amendment concerns so easily:
The meaning of the First Amendment is a function of competing
views about what sort of relation between government and markets
will best promote democratic deliberation. Lawyers (and not a few
nonlawyers) have an unfortunate habit of thinking that the
meaning of the First Amendment precedes rather than postdates
227
that inquiry.
These two sentences encapsulate the republican view of the First
Amendment, and they indicate the potentially repressive nature of
civic republican theory. Civic republicans believe that as with other
rights, the First Amendment right of free expression is socially
constructed. In other words, it is a reflection of the power
relationships in society. Thus, in many situations, civic republican
theory views the First Amendment as an impediment to the
achievement of republican ideals. In a republican political structure, the free expression of some individuals and groups may have
to be severely limited to ensure that the government can achieve its
goals of equalizing power, identifying the common good, and
228
cultivating civic virtue.
224 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 18.

2 The civic republican reasons for this conclusion are discussed above. Seesupra
notes 56-102 and accompanying text.
226 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 18.
22 Id. at 28.
228 Sunstein even gives us a list of First Amendment "bad guys," whose free speech
rights cannot be expected to survive very long in a republican state: "cigarette
companies seeking to advertise their products; corporations attempting to influence
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The republicans' treatment of sexually explicit expression
illustrates their dim view of free expression. This is the corner of
First Amendment law that has generated the most comment from
230
Both Sunstein 229 and Michelman
civic republican theorists.
have produced full-length articles on the subject, and Sunstein has
repeatedly cited sexual expression as an area that a republican
government may regulate and control in order to override improper
2
(i.e., distorted) private preferences. 3'

The republicans' theoretical justification for regulating sexual
expression provides a framework that can easily be used to justify
regulating other types of expression that communicate attitudes and
ideas disfavored by the political majority in a republican community.232 I have dealt elsewhere with the many problems presented

electoral outcomes; people engaged in racial hate speech; pornographers; and large
networks objecting to a private right of access to broadcasting or to other efforts to
promote quality and diversity in the media." Id. at 27.
229 See Sunstein, supra note 190.
230 See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291 (1989).
231 See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1156-57; Sunstein, supra note 32, at 31-32.
232 Sunstein gives several other examples of speech that would be regulated by his
version of the republican state: racial hate speech, commercial speech, television
broadcasting, and electoral campaigns. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 28-32. But it
is safe to say that these are just the first entries on what would be a long list.
Sunstein objects to the current contents of television broadcasting because it is "a
system in which most viewers see shows that rarely deal with serious problems; are
frequently sensationalistic, prurient, dehumanizing, or banal; reflect and perpetuate
a bland, watered-down version of the most conventional views about politics and
morality; are influenced excessively by the concerns of advertisers; produce an
accelerating 'race to the bottom' in terms of the quality and quantity of attention that
they require and encourage; and are often riddled with violence, sexism, and racism."
Id. at 28.
Of course, the same could be said of many other forms of popular (and for that
matter, "high-brow") culture. Thus, it is not immediately evident why Sunstein would
stop at regulation of television broadcasting. Indeed, there are strong indications that
he would not stop there. His model for regulation is Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, the Supreme Court permitted the
government to regulate the content of broadcast television because "there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate." Id. at 388. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the government could force
broadcast licensees to share the scarce resource of the airwaves with others who are
unable to obtain a broadcast license. The Court has refused to extend this scarcity
argument for governmental regulation beyond the special circumstance of
broadcasting. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(overturning state regulation of newspaper editorial policies and refusing to apply the
scarcity argument beyond the broadcasting industry). But Sunstein views Red Lion
as embodying the much broader principle that "government regulation intended to
promote equality may further first amendment interests-indeed, may even be
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by the censorship of sexual expression. 23 3 I will not repeat the
details of that critique here. For present purposes, I will focus on
the application of Sunstein's and Michelman's general principle that
government is properly concerned with modifying the attitudes of
23 4
citizens to fit the government's prescribed ideal.

required by them." Sunstein, supra note 190, at 620. Sunstein's view of Red Lion

gives the case implications that do not stop at the "scarce" medium of television and
radio broadcasting. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 29 n.31 (implicitly disapproving
of the Tornillo holding).
The criticism Sunstein levels at television programming can be asserted with
equal vigor against every other branch of the media. Thus, Sunstein's argument for
improving the moral content of the media would presumably give the government
"the power to engage in a wide range of controls," id. at 28, over every aspect of the
media: records, concerts, movies, videotapes, theater, the visual arts, and even books.
233 See Gey, supra note 66.

234 Aside from the "harms" represented by improper attitudes, Sunstein cites two
other types of harm to justify regulation of sexual expression. The first is that
"pornography harms those women who are coerced into and brutalized in the process
of producing pornography." Sunstein, supra note 190, at 595. But Sunstein himself
notes that many laws are presently available to protect women and men who are
coerced into sexual activity, including assault, kidnapping, and sexual abuse laws. Id.
at 596. Sunstein offers no evidence that these laws cannot be enforced effectively,
other than his conclusion that these laws are unlikely to be effective "in light of the
enormous profits to be made from pornography and the difficulty and cost of
ferreting out and punishing particular abuses." Id. at 596. Sunstein has stated
elsewhere that the government should be permitted to foreclose minority preferences
(such as the preference for sexually explicit materials) "only when less restrictive
alternatives ... are impossible or ineffective." Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142.
Thus, by Sunstein's own terms the regulation of sexual expression cannot bejustified
by this type of harm unless definitive proof is available that rigorous enforcement of
alternative measures could not alleviate the problem.
The second type of harm cited by Sunstein to justify regulation of sexual
expression is the "sexual violence directed against women, violence that would not
have occurred but for the massive circulation of pornography." Sunstein, supra note
190, at 597. No definitive scientific evidence exists, however, to support such an
unqualified statement about the link between sexual violence and exposure to explicit
sexual expression. Unsupported generalizations of this sort in the Final Report of
Attorney General Edwin Meese's Commission on Pornography (upon which Sunstein
relies heavily) led three members of the Commission to submit the following
statement summarizing the evidence available on this subject: "[flt is essential to state
that the social science research has not been designed to evaluate the relationship
between exposure to pornography and the commission of sexual crimes; therefore
efforts to tease the current data into proof of a causal link between these acts simply
cannot be accepted." ATr'Y GEN.'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 204 (1986) (statement of Judith Becker, Ellen Levine, and

Deanne Tilton-Durfee). These serious problems of proof led the Commission's
majority to manipulate the definition of "harm" in order to reach its desired
conclusions supporting suppression of sexual materials. See Gey, supra 66, at 15991604.
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1. Justifications for the Political Correction
of Improper Attitudes
The argument applying this general principle to the proposed
suppression of some sexually explicit material 23 5 contains three
elements. The starting point for regulation of this expression is the
determination that the expression is not truly autonomous. This
draws on the civic republican views discussed above 23 6 relating to
the "phenomenon of endogenous preferences." 23 7 In this context, the "use of both pornography and prostitutes can be understood as consumption choices that result from relations of power." 238 Therefore, according to the second element of the
argument, if the government is permitted to rearrange improper
private allocations of financial, sexual, or racial power, it should also
be permitted to restructure the ideological and attitudinal reflections of these flawed power relationships. The final element in the
argument is the assertion that government control of expression will
correct the balance of power. According to Sunstein, "interference
with those choices [i.e., preferences for sexually explicit speech] may
promote rather than undermine autonomy." 23 9 Each of these
three contentions is significantly flawed.
The first element of the republican argument is little more than
a truism. It is true that to the extent that we are all the product of
our backgrounds and conditioning, which by definition includes our
position in the social, political, and economic hierarchy, our
"consumption choices result from relations of power." But the
republicans ignore the fact that this would also be true in a purified
civic republican state. Contrary to the third element of the
republican argument, permitting government regulation of
expression will not alter this fact; ironically, it will accentuate it. In
the republican community the "relations of power" will still exist,
235 Michelman argues in favor of an anti-pornography statute enacted by the
Indianapolis City Council, which was found unconstitutional by the United States
Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,

771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (per curiam). Sunstein
offers a more limited version of the same concept, suggesting that it should be
permissible to regulate materials that are "(a)... sexually explicit, (b) depict women

as enjoying or deserving some form of physical abuse, and (c) have the purpose and
effect
of producing sexual arousal." Sunstein, supra note 190, at 592.
2
36 See supra notes 56-102 and accompanying text.
237 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 5.

238 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1156.
239 Id.
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but they will be given a very important force for social control that
they do not presently possess: the authority to use the apparatus of
the government-including everything from the criminal justice
system to the educational system-to cultivate ideals that the
community's power structure has identified as part of the "common
good." Thus, while it will always be true that "relations of power"
will affect how people think about the world, it is also true that
some relations of power are more effective than others in ensuring
that people will think about the world in a particular way.
The second element of the republican argument for systematic
censorship is partly a response to this observation. Why, the civic
republicans ask, is everyone so concerned about protecting
expression from government regulation in an era when we are
willing to permit government to regulate virtually every other aspect
of private behavior? Why are private preferences, as opposed to
private behaviors, so sacrosanct? Why not permit government to
nip the improper behaviors in the bud, so to speak, by preventing
people from thinking the thoughts that lead them to behave in bad
ways? According to Professor Michelman, this squeamishness about
political censorship is inconsistent with the basic vision embodied
in the constitution. Indeed, Michelman argues that permitting
government to exercise political control over attitudes is mandated
by the constitutional vision (that is, the civic republican constitution240
al vision) of deliberative democracy.
There is a surface logic to these assertions. 24 1 On a superficial level, it may seem that our present system hypocritically permits
government to control behavior, but only by relatively inefficient
means. Upon closer consideration, however, inefficiency in the
application of power may be an asset in a democracy. Maybe our
system protects the opinions of people whose behavior we regulate
because we have trained ourselves to understand that our regula240 "Deliberative" democracy has a specialized meaning in Michelman's work. It
is the form of democracy that characterizes his vision of a republican society.
"Deliberative" democracy "connotes an argumentative interchange among persons
who recognize each other as equal in authority and entitlement to respect, jointly
directed by them towards arriving at a reasonable answer to some question of public
ordering...." Michelman, supra note 230, at 293. The opposite of a "deliberative"
democracy is a "strategic" democracy, in which "a strategic outcome represents not
a collective judgment of reason but a vector sum in the field of forces." Id.
241 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting)
("Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.").
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tions do not always serve the purpose we initially intend. In the
example of sexual expression discussed by Michelman and Sunstein,
it may be true that the expression at issue "cause[s] grave harms to
the social status and concrete interests of many women."242

On

the other hand, as a group of feminists opposing government
regulation of sexual materials argues, a statute regulating such

expression may itself embody a discriminatory and paternalistic
attitude which "implies that individual women are incapable of
choosing for themselves what they consider to be enjoyable, sexually
arousing material without being degraded or humiliated." 243 The
dangerous aspect of republican arguments favoring censorship of
sexual materials is their central premise that a collective political
body can determine, definitively and for everyone, how to look at
an issue as complicated, subjective, and personalized as sexual
24 4
desire.
2. Civic Republican Censorship and the Perspectives
of Political Winners and Losers
It is at first puzzling that sensitive theorists such as Michelman
and Sunstein so heavily discount the dangers inherent in such a
system. 245 The explanation for this oddity, I believe, can be
242 Michelman, supra note 230, at 295.
24
3 Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, BriefAmici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship

Taskforce, 21 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 69, 102 (1987-88).
244 Space limitations bar a more thorough critique of civic republicanism's
implications for other specific areas of First Amendment jurisprudence. For an
excellent and detailed analysis of this subject, whose conclusions largely coincide with
those suggested here, see Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression
and the Civic Republican Revival in ConstitutionalTheory: The Ominous Implications, 79
CAL. L. REV. 267 (1991).
245 Professor Sherry is much less willing to grant the government broad powers
of censorship, although she too envisions "a more active role for government" than
the traditional liberal "rights model." SuzannaSherry, AnEssay ConcerningToleration,
71 MINN. L. REV. 963, 989 (1987). Unfortunately, Professor Sherry's understandable
reluctance to give government the extensive powers of censorship granted by Sunstein
and Michelman is inconsistent with the heavy emphasis she (and all civic republicans)
place on the government's role as moral educator. There is no theoretically
consistent way to withhold from government the power of censorship, while
simultaneously granting government the authority to use every other power at its
disposal to cultivate the proper ethos among its citizens. See Gey, supra note 66, at

1615-18.
Professor Sherry's response to recent efforts to prohibit hate speech at
universities suffers from the same internal inconsistency. See Suzanna Sherry,
Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech, 75
MINN. L. REv. 933 (1991). In this article, Sherry repeats her support for a republican
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found in the presumptions both professors make about the system

they propose. Both Michelman and Sunstein are sanguine about the
legislative products of a republican state because they view their
system from the perspective of political winners. For example, both
men regard their proposed pornography regulation statutes as good
policy, and they clearly believe that their statutes are the logical
product of a proper republican dialogue. Thus, they consider
contrary constitutional arguments against the proposals' explicit
viewpoint discrimination 2 6 as examples of the critics' "pessimistic
view of the democratic political ethos." 247 In contrast, civic
republican theory would have us take a highly optimistic view of the
political process. Civic republican theory urges, in Michelman's
words, that we "take an occasional chance, in favorable circumstances, that the aspiration [to the ideal of deliberative democracy] is
248
true in practice."
Professors Sunstein and Michelman might take a very different
view of political power if they adopted the perspective of political
jurisprudence, which "de-emphasizes individual rights in favor of individual
responsibility to the community, or civic virtue." Id. at 934. As discussed in the text,
this emphasis permits Sunstein and Michelman to argue in favor of broad regulation
of speech. Sherry, however, takes a different tack. She introduces a distinction
between virtue and manners, and argues that "only manners can be coerced. A
government can enforce outward behavior, but compelling people to behave in the
way that a virtuous person would behave cannot make people virtuous." Id. at 934
(footnote omitted). Sherry then argues that modern hate speech regulations at
various universities "are indeed intended to legislate virtue, not manners." Id. at 942.
This leads her to conclude that the regulations are inconsistent with a proper
understanding of civic republican theory.
I concur with both Professor Sherry's observation that virtue cannot be enforced
and her critical description of the clear import of modern university hate speech
regulations. But contrary to Professor Sherry, I believe that consistent application of
civic republican theory would support these regulations. Sherry argues that the
university speech codes are "explainable only as the use of raw political power to
enforce orthodoxy." Id. at 944. I agree, but as Sunstein's and Michelman's
arguments indicate, I believe that this use of power is thoroughly consistent with the
civic republican approach to free expression. Most republican theorists-certainly
Sunstein and Michelman-would disagree strongly with the assertion that "only
manners can be coerced." As Professor Sunstein has stated his position, "a
democratic government should sometimes take private preferences as an object of
regulation and control." Sunstein, supra note 32, at 13. Sunstein has used this
theoretical stance to specifically advocate the regulation of hate speech-not just in
university settings, but in society as a whole. Id. at 31-32.
246 For a discussion of the First Amendment claim of viewpoint discrimination as
applied to this type of statute, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-PornographyLegislationas
Viewpoint-Discrimination,9 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461 (1986).
247 Michelman, supra note 230, at 316.
248 Id. at 319.
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losers instead of political winners. Given a different set of political
actors, the same arguments that Sunstein and Michelman use to ban
pornography could be used by a socially conservative civic republican majority to ban all speech advocating or encouraging homosexuality. 249 All that would be required is a social setting in which a
consensus forms around the proposition that homosexuality is
unnatural and morally wrong.
An intellectually consistent adherent of civic republicanism
could not object to such legislation on the ground that it is
premised on nothing more than a disputable moral stance, because
civic republican theory specifically anticipates that society will define
itself morally through political dialogue. 250 Also, my hypothetical
anti-homosexuality political contingent could easily devise an
attenuated chain of causation linking homosexuality to actual,
physical harm (e.g., the transmission of AIDS) 251 that is analogous
to the attenuated linkage cited by Sunstein between the viewing of
pornography and the commission of sex crimes. 252 The reader
will recall that the modern civic republican term "consensus" does

249 To make the analogy even closer, an alternative proposal might be made to
prohibit any sexually explicit materials appealing to homosexuals.
250 The civic republicans occasionally resort to vague rules about removing some
issues, such as those involving consensual sexual activity, from government
interference. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 32, at 19. But as discussed above, seesupra
notes 176-92 and accompanying text, these attempts to remove some issues from the
community's control are inconsistent with major themes of civic republican theory.
First, these attempts to protect aspects of individual autonomy conflict with the
overriding civic republican notion that individual autonomy is nothing more than a
reflection of social forces, which may be redirected by the political structure. Seesupra
notes 56-98 and accompanying text. Second, the attempt to carve out certain issues
from social control is a resort to exogenous values, in direct conflict with the central
civic republican belief that all preferences are "shifting and endogenous rather than
exogenous, and as a result are a function of current information, consumption
patterns, legal rules, and general social pressures." Sunstein, supra note 32, at 10.
A proponent of the hypothetical legislation discussed in the text would argue, in good
republican fashion, that the only reason Sunstein thinks consensual sexual behavior
should be given special protection is because his own preferences have been warped
by extended exposure to the overly permissive atmosphere of a university campus.
According to the very terms of Sunstein's own civic republican analysis, there is no
reason whatever that the community must use the libidinous university as the model
for morality in society as a whole.
251 The argument is simple: Viewing homosexual expression creates "urgings"
that would not otherwise exist; these urgings lead to actual behavior (i.e., homosexual
sex); this behavior sometimes takes the form of promiscuous, unprotected sex; and
this promiscuous sex leads to the proliferation of AIDS. For a recent decision
denying the rights of homosexuals based on such an argument, see Steffan v. Cheney,
780 F. Supp. 1, 13-15 (D.D.C. 1991).
252 See supra note 228.

1993)

CIVIC REPUBLICANISM

not require the community to obtain unanimous consent for its
legislation. 253 Thus, the existence of a minority group within the
community that is strongly opposed to the prevailing consensus
would not disempower the majority of the community from reading
its moral consensus into law and prohibiting expression that
cultivates what the majority believes is the moral harm of homosexuality.
Although they do not acknowledge the affinity, Sunstein and
Michelman have a compatriot in Robert Bork. The civic republicans
share with Bork the following premise: "Truth is what the majority
thinks it is at any given moment precisely because the majority is
permitted to govern and to redefine its values constantly." 254 To
Bork, as well as the civic republicans, power is truth. Bork,
however, views the ramifications of this stance much more clearly
than the ever optimistic civic republicans. In defending his decision
as an appellate judge to uphold the Navy's policy of discharging all
homosexuals, Bork wrote that "[r]elativism in these matters may or
may not be an arguable moral stance ...

but moral relativism is

55

Having articulated what

hardly a constitutional command....

253 See supra notes 198-218 and accompanying text.
254 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 30 (1971). There is, in fact, very little difference between Bork's view and that
of the civic republicans regarding the First Amendment. Compare id. at 29 (stating
that the First Amendment protects only speech that is explicitly political, narrowly
defined as "criticisms of public officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or
repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions and speech addressed to the conduct
of any governmental unit in the country") with Sunstein, supra note 190, at 622 ("The
guarantee of free speech is designed largely to combat the evils of factional tyranny
and self-interested representation, and to ensure that government outcomes are the
product of some form of deliberation on the part of the citizenry."). Bork would thus
deny any constitutional protection to speech outside this narrow category.
"[C]onstitutionally, art and pornography are on a par with industry and smoke
pollution." Bork, supra, at 29. The same principle would logically apply in a civic
republican system, which permits political bodies to weigh the costs and benefits of
every instance of speech. See Michelman, supra note 230, at 303-05, 318-19. In both
the civic republican and Borkian universes, "a majority surely has as much control
over the moral and aesthetic environment as it does over the physical." Bork, supra,
at 29.
25 Dronenburgv. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (denial of rehearing

en banc). In Judge Bork's full opinion in this case, he restated principles first
articulated in his article on free speech:
This theory that majority morality and majority choice is always made

presumptively invalid by the Constitution attacks the very predicate of
democratic government. When the Constitution does not speak to the
contrary, the choices of those put in authority by the electoral process, or
those who are accountable to such persons, come before us not as suspect
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Michelman would call an "optimistic" theory of the democratic
ethos, 256 Bork is willing to ascribe legitimacy to whatever conclusions the deliberative processes reach. This deferential approach to
the political process is also the theoretical foundation of the
Supreme Court's opinion upholding a statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.25 7
Like Bork, civic republicans also "reject ethical relativism and
skepticism." 258 Also like Bork, they would permit the community
to define its common ethos through political dialogue, and override
by governmental dictate competing views that threaten the common
good. Yet, for all the civic republicans' professed optimism about
the exercise of raw political power, they also seek to ensure that the
community can only exercise its collective moral authority in one
direction.
This observation is evident from Professor Michelman's
extended argument that the result in Bowers v. Hardwick is inconsistent with civic republican principles. 259 According to Michelman,
Georgia's "moral rejection of homosexual life" runs afoul of "the
modern republican commitment to social plurality."260
But
plurality alone is no justification for invalidating a statute in a civic
republican society. Indeed, republican principles reject the notion
that society must protect a social plurality that includes individuals
who reject the common good. 261 Accordingly, claims that are
based on plurality are not likely to convince a conservative civic
republican supporter of Bowers-type legislation that such legislation
is inconsistent with republican principles.
Michelman also casts the plurality argument in a slightly
different form by claiming that the Georgia statute upheld in Bowers

because majoritarian but as conclusively valid for that very reason.
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.).
256 See Michelman, supra note 230, at 316-19 (questioning the right of ourjudges
"to adopt [a] particular pessimistic view of the democratic political ethos-a view of
it as resumptively strategic rather than deliberative").
2X "The law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process
Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986).
258 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
259 See Michelman, supra note 2 at 1494-99.
260 Id. at 1533.
261 "[O]n republican grounds it is unclear that 'neutrality' among competing
conceptions of the good life is always desirable even if it were possible for
governmental institutions to achieve it." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1570.
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impairs the citizenship of individuals "for whom homosexuality is an
aspect of identity." 262 A Georgia legislator supporting the legislation, however, could easily answer by quoting Professor Sunstein's
frank statement that "[d]esires as well as acts may be irrational or
wrong." 263 Michelman himself says elsewhere that "[a]ny view in
which the true, primary interests of individuals are 'exogenous' or
prior to politics is unrepublican." 2 64 Michelman might argue that
sexual desire is an exception to this rule, but since he has demonstrated a willingness to submit sexual desire to governmental
regulation in other contexts, this argument is foreclosed to
265
him.
Finally, Michelman asserts that Bowers is inconsistent with
republican principles because it violates homosexuals' privacy
rights. 266 But Michelman's argument for "an appreciation of
privacy as a political right" 267 flies directly in the face of republican theory's most important tenets. Civic republican theory has as
one of its main goals the intervention of public power into "the
intimate associations through which personal moral understandings
and identities are formed and sustained."268 Both Sunstein and
Michelman have argued repeatedly that private preferences should
not be considered off limits to the political process, because prepolitical preferences are often non-autonomous and harmful to the
commonweal.2 6 9
262
263
264
265

Michelman, supra note 2, at 1533.
Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1135.
Michelman, supra note 4, at 27.
See Michelman, supra note 230 and accompanying text.
266 Michelman,supra note 2, at 1533-36 (stating that "republican inspiration enters
the privacy-based argument for a reversal of Boweis").
67 Id. at 1535.
268 Id. at 1536.
269 See supra notes 56-98 and accompanying text. Some of the civic republican
statements on this subject seem ready-made for a conservative government
determined to prohibit homosexual behavior. Sunstein has argued that "if adaptive
preferences are not part of conscious 'character planning,' and if they come about
during a process of conditioning over which people exercise no control, there is an
important sense in which the resulting preferences are not autonomous." Sunstein,
supra note 31, at 1147 (footnotes omitted). Sunstein and Michelman would
undoubtedly argue that homosexuality is not an "adaptive preference" in this sense.
They would argue, along with Sylvia Law, that homosexuality is "an aspect of identity
demanding respect." Michelman, supra note 2, at 1533 (citing Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaningof Gender, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 187, 207-18) (noting
the scientific appreciation of homosexuality as not being an illness)). I agree. The
point, however, is that many people-probably most people-disagree. I suspect that
most people sincerely believe that homosexuality is a personality malformation-in
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I use the example of homosexuality on purpose; an antihomosexual consensus undoubtedly exists in society, 270 and if our
political system were transformed overnight into a pure civicrepublican state, this consensus would probably soon produce
something similar to my hypothetical homosexual-speech legislation
and/or Georgia's consensual sodomy statute. Despite Professor
Michelman's attempt to preclude the possibility of such legislation,
the civic republicans have no intellectually defensible basis on which
to oppose regulations of "deviant" sexuality. Individual autonomy
in matters of sexuality, as well as other pre-political preferences are
subordinated to the civic republican's peculiar view of collectively
dictated autonomy: "political autonomy can be found in collective
self-determination, as citizens decide, not what they 'want,' but
instead who they are, what their values are, and what those values
require." 2 71 If the society decides that its values are exclusively
heterosexual, woe to the person who "wants" to be homosexual.
The third and final element of the civic republican argument
favoring censorship of sexually explicit expression rests on the belief
that "interference with those choices [i.e., preferences for sexually
explicit speech] may promote rather than undermine autonomy. "2 72 As we have seen, "autonomy" has a special meaning in
civic republican theory. The term means "collective self-determination." If the term "autonomy" is understood in this way, the
preceding quotation is undoubtedly true. Collective interference
with sexual expression will certainly promote collective selfdetermination.
Yet contrary to the republicans' assertions,
substituting collective self-determination for individual autonomy
will not eliminate the distortions built into individual citizens' views
of themselves and their world. It also will not correct the imbalance
of power that leads to these distortions. Instead, it will introduce

Sunstein's terms, an adaptive preference formed in response to some flaw in the
individual's genetic or environmental background. Again, I agree with Sunstein and
Michelman that this judgment is wrong, but civic republican theory provides a
framework that can give such judgments a thin layer of legitimacy. Civic republicanism's deference to collective judgments of moral value permits intolerance to be
transformed into law, under the comforting aegis of civic virtue.
270 The Supreme Court used this consensus to justify its refusal to overturn the
statute in Bowers. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (stating that
"to claim a right to engage in [homosexual] conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best,
facetious").
271 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 13.
272 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1156.
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an entirely different set of distortions into the process of individual
value-definition. These new distortions are potentially much more
dangerous than the anarchic influences operating in a society that
does not permit the government to identify and eradicate "bad"
desires and beliefs in order to replace them with socially approved
"good" desires and beliefs.
The protection of civil liberties-including the right to believe
and desire things the majority shuns and despises-is not an
incidental aspect of democratic theory. I would even argue that a
society lacking strong protections of civil liberties cannot accurately
be called a democracy. In a democracy, individuals must be
permitted to "want" things even though they cannot support those
wants with reasons that satisfy the government or the political
majority that controls the government. This argument contradicts
the very essence of civic republican theory. If I am correct, civic
republicanism contains a fatal flaw; despite all the republican talk
of deliberation and self-determination, the theory is in reality based
on a series of anti-democratic principles. The next section elaborates on this argument.
IV. CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE LOSERS' PRINCIPLES
IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

It is difficult to define the term "democracy" precisely.
Democracies may incorporate vastly different economic
schemes 2 73 and use widely varied mechanisms to channel political
debate and reach decisions about social policy. 274 The one
common characteristic found in all democratic systems is the
27

3 The United States could fairly be described as a democracy both before 1937when almost all political regulation of economic affairs was prohibited by the
Supreme Court's property-rights decisions-as well as after 1937, after which the
Supreme Court granted the elected branches of government wide latitude to regulate
economic affairs.
274 For example, a democracy may operate effectively with either a parliamentary
system or an American-style separation-of-powers scheme. Democracies may use
proportional representation, as do many continental European systems, seesupra note
151, or they may use a majority system typical in the American scheme, or they may
use a "first-past-the-post" system similar to Great Britain's (in which the candidate
with the mostvotes wins the election, even if the candidate does not obtain a majority
of votes cast). Democracies may use a federal system, with strong local governments
(as in the United States and Germany), or they may centralize power in the national
legislature, as Britain did during Margaret Thatcher's tenure as Prime Minister.
Finally, democracies may rely solely on political representatives, or they may use some
form of referendum system for introducing direct voter input into policymaking.
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presumption described by E. B. White: "Democracy is the recurrent
suspicion that more than half the people are right more than half
of the time."275 This presumption crosses the ideological borders
within democratic theory. Even the most conservative and elitist
forms of democratic theory276 cite popular consent as the cornerstone of political legitimacy.
If popular consent is the one consistent theme in all forms of
democratic theory, civic republicanism appears on the surface to be
the quintessential democratic theory. Civic republican theory gives
virtually complete deference to the exercise of popular will through
government.2 7 7
In seemingly good democratic fashion, civic
republicanism ascribes legitimacy to value determinations only if
278
they are the product of public dialogue and "self-legislation."
Likewise, civic republicanism submits every aspect of private belief
and desire to political control whenever "the public seeks to
implement, through democratic processes culminating in law, widely
held social aspirations or collective desires." 279 Finally, no policy
or value determination can be enforced in a civic republican society
without a consensus among the governed. 28 0 In Sunstein's words,
281
agreement is the "regulative ideal" of the civic republican state.
It would be difficult to devise a political theory more avowedly
oriented toward popular consent than civic republicanism.
The heavy emphasis placed by civic republicans on self-governance and intense political involvement by all citizens can be seen
as an appeal to the purest form of the democratic ideal. Nevertheless, despite the superficial resemblance between civic republican
theory and the democratic ideal on which it draws, the civic
republican traits described in the previous paragraph actually
demonstrate something quite different than what civic republicanism's proponents intend. These traits of civic republicanism actually
275 ELwYN B. WHITE, THE WILD FLAG 31 (1946).
276 See, e.g.,JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269
(3d ed. 1950) (defining democracy as the competition of individuals for popular
endorsement of their right to rule).
277 Civic republicans withhold deference to popular will only when necessary to
protect an undefined but small category of rights. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at
1142. I have already noted that the existence of even a small category of rights seems
inconsistent with the main thrust of civic republican theory. See supranotes 181-218
and accompanying text.
278 Michelman, supra note 4, at 27.
279 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 13.
280 See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
281 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
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demonstrate the ultimate incompatibility of civic republicanism and
true democracy. The civic republicans inadvertently propose an
undemocratic system because they focus on only a portion of what
makes a society democratic. They focus almost exclusively on the
means by which political majorities controlling a democracy create,
legitimate, and enforce policy decisions. The foundation of the
civic republican system is the dialogue among political participants.
The system is structured to ensure that the dialogue will produce
consensus, and this consensus is then legitimated by referring back
to the dialogue that produced it. It is a circular system, but it
exudes credibility because the theoretical circle begins and ends
with the common democratic presumption of popular consent.
As Professor Michelman has noted, civic republicans, such as
himself, take a highly optimistic attitude toward "the democratic
political ethos," 28 2 which they interpret as relatively unbridled
majority rule. 283 As I argued in the previous section, this optimistic attitude may be attributable to the fact that the republicans
adopt the perspective of political winners in the democratic process.
By viewing the world from this perspective, however, the civic
republicans give short shrift to the elements of modern democratic
theory that are necessary to console and protect political losers. A
truly democratic theory must incorporate both "winners' principles"
and "losers' principles." Like the winners' principles that are
heavily emphasized by the civic republicans, the losers' principles
are also derived from democratic theory's foundational premise that
all political legitimacy is derived from popular consent. This point
is not immediately obvious because losers' principles are a paradoxical feature of democratic theory. The paradox is that losers'
principles require a democratic political system to limit the exercise
of popular political power. Despite their paradoxical nature, the
losers' principles are an absolutely essential component of all truly
democratic theories. A political system that does not incorporate
282

See Michelman, supra note 230, at 316.

283 See Michelman, supra note 230, at 316-19. As always, when I refer to majority
rule in civic republican theory, I am assuming that the republican majority engages
in the proper dialogue before reaching its consensus, and justifies its political
conclusions with public-spirited rationales. Once these stipulations are met, civic

republican theory accepts that the majority can do what it wants, even if it means
overriding the wishes of the minority. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142 (stating
that the "foreclosure of the preferences of a minority is unfortunate, but in general
it is hard to see what argument there might be for creating an across-the-board rule
against self-binding through politics.").
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some version of losers' principles cannot accurately be described as
democratic because such a system cannot ensure that a group
acquiring power will refrain from using its control over governmental functions to make permanent its otherwise temporary political
ascendancy.
Losers' principles guarantee that a political system governed by
popular consent in the first year of its existence will continue to be
governed by popular consent in perpetuity. In other words, losers'
principles ensure that a democracy remains democratic. In order
to remain true to democracy's universal mandate of popular
consent, distributions of power must remain fluid. No individual or
group may be permitted to use temporary political ascendancy to
project political control into the indefinite future. Losers' principles serve this essential function. Three losers' principles of
modern democratic theory relate to themes prominent in civic
republican literature and therefore deserve a brief discussion here:
radical skepticism, the impermanence of power, and individual
autonomy. My claim that civic republican theory is ultimately
undemocratic is based on civic republicanism's rejection of these
three principles.
A. The Principleof Radical Skepticism
The first losers' principle that the civic republicans deny is the
attitude of radical skepticism toward all collective assertions of
value. Like all losers' principles, value skepticism is derived from
democracy's recurrent theme of popular consent. Skepticism
follows from the notion of popular consent because a democratic
society may not be governed by any policy or principle that
precedes the assertion of popular will. If popular consent is the
source of all political legitimacy, any system that derives a portion
of its legitimacy from a source other than popular consent (i.e.,
from God, or natural law, or other extrahuman source) is, to the
extent of its reliance on external sources of value, undemocratic.
In a democracy, all principles and policies must be open to
question all the time. This principle produces another democratic
paradox: all democratic decisions are inherently suspect. According to the skepticism principle, the fact that the democratic process
produces a particular policy decision does not mean that the
decision is substantively correct. It simply means that for the
moment, the decision has the support of the requisite number of
relevant political actors in a particular society. No member of
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society is required to endorse any decision made by that society, nor
relent in thinking that a particular decision is counterproductive or
284

morally wrong.

The skepticism that I have just described is a potentially
destabilizing factor in any political structure. This is exactly the
point: the portion of society that worries about stability is the
portion that has "gotten its way" and is concerned about enforcing
its chosen values-that is, the winners. The acidic nature of the
pervasive skepticism I have described threatens political winners
because it threatens the ties that bind citizens to their government
and its policies. But the alternative to radical political skepticism is
political certainty, which makes healthy democratic government
impossible. The stability that political certainty provides is actually
counterproductive in a democracy.
The dangers of political certainty in a democratic political
system are evident from civic republican theory's treatment of
political skepticism. Reliance on political certainty is a central
governing presumption of civic republican theory. Sunstein states
the republican position unequivocally. He asserts that civic
republicans "reject ethical relativism and skepticism,"285 and
Proponents of civic republicanism can be expected to argue that the skepticism
principle contradicts itself. After all, if everything is open to question in a democratic
society, it also should be possible to question, or even reject, the principle of
skepticism. For a version of this argument used against relativist themes in liberal
theory, see Stanley Fish, LiberalismDoesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997. It is true that
according to the skepticism principle, a society may decide to reject skepticism, as the
civic republicans argue, and base the political structure on some purportedly universal
value or values. By the same token, however, a democratic society may democratically
decide to abandon democracy. This observation does not mean, in Fish's terms, that
democracy "doesn't exist." It simply means that democratic means can be employed
to achieve distinctly undemocratic ends.
In a democratic system, universal values will always be subject to doubt by
citizens, whether the government likes it or not. This is not because the skepticism
principle is important as an abstract theoretical matter, but rather because the
principle describes the basic attitude democratic citizens bring to political deliberations. Unquestioning belief is not a democratic attitude and cannot be a basis for
valid popular consent. Conversely, popular consent is a meaningless basis for
democratic political legitimacy if those who gain control over the political system can
use their power to manufacture the necessary consent. Therefore, a political system
that denies citizens the right to entertain doubts about the system's dominant values
is incompatible with democratic principles. The ruling majority of a democratic
system may disavow the skepticism principle, but only if it is willing to accept the
consequences of becoming something other than a democracy.
25 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
284
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argues that the republican political process "is designed to produce
28 6
substantively correct outcomes."
The civic republicans' unequivocal rejection of skepticism leaves
them with only two alternative theoretical positions, both of which
are incompatible with any conception of democracy. One alternative is to base political certainty on a set of preexisting, essentialist
principles that members of society may neither question nor alter.
Sunstein rejects this alternative in theory, 287 although his stated
position is inconsistent with other aspects of civic republican
theory, 2 88 and is also inconsistent with his stated desire to remove
particular decisions from the political process. 28 9 Putting aside
the civic republican inconsistency on the subject of essentialism, the
concept is undoubtedly incompatible with democracy because it
locates political authority outside the range of human control. By
definition, the removal of any important political issue from human
control violates the indispensable democratic axiom of popular
consent.
The second alternative to skepticism is equally unpalatable. It
is the position staked out by Robert Bork: "Truth is what the
majority thinks it is at any given moment precisely because the

majority is permitted to govern and to redefine its values constantly." 290 This observation amounts to a facially democratic version
of the assertion that might makes right. Whoever controls the
political process controls the truth. As Orwellian as this alternative
seems, 291 it appears to be the alternative that the civic republicans
286 Id.

287 "[Republicans] do not depend on a belief in ultimate foundations for political
outcomes." Id. at 1554.
288 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
289 See supra note 250.

290 Bork, supra note 254, at 30.
21 I referred earlier to the parallels between some aspects of civic republican
theory and the theories of power espoused by Orwell's fictional inquisitor O'Brien in
his conversations with the naive individualist Winston. See supra note 69. At another
point in the O'Brien/Winston conversation, O'Brien takes the linkage between truth
and majority power to its logical conclusion. O'Brien says:
We control matter because we control the mind. Reality is inside the
skull.... There is nothing that we could not do. Invisibility, levitationanything. I could float off this floor like a soap bubble if I wished to. I do
not wish to, because the Party does not wish it. You must get rid of those
nineteenth-century ideas about the laws of nature. We make the laws of
nature.
ORWELL, supranote 69, at 268. Winston initially resists this metaphysical imperialism,
but finally succumbs to the irresistible authority of power. The civic republicans have
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have chosen to replace the ethical anarchy they see at the heart of
pluralist democratic theories. 29 2 The only major difference
between Bork and the civic republicans is that Bork accepts the
pluralist premise that the political process should and will reflect
the desires and attitudes formed by citizens outside the political
process. In contrast, the civic republicans argue that the political
process will transform those who participate in it, and therefore
produce a set of preferences that escape the unjust influences they
293
find in the pre-political world.
Actually, as discussed above, 294 the civic republicans go
beyond a recognition of the obvious fact that participation in the
political process will change the perceptions of the participants.
They also argue that those who emerge victorious in the political
process should actively use their political power to modify every
citizen's perceptions to fit the collectively determined ideal. The
civic republican government is intended not just to implement
collective desires, but also to discover and teach collective virtue. 295 The transformative function of government proposed by
the civic republicans actually makes their theory significantly less
democratic than Bork's. When Bork speaks of "truth," his tongue
is at least partially planted in his cheek. His majority's "truth" is a
momentary phenomenon, subject to change as the political winds
obviously never suggested that they would take their majoritarian notions ofpolitical
power this far, but their logic certainly leads them in that direction. For an example
of a civic republican fellow-traveler who has already arrived at the Orwellian
destination, see Fish, supra note 284.
292 For a general discussion of Sunstein's critical description of pluralism, see
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1542-47 (arguing that "pluralism is an altogether
unattractive conception of politics").
293 "[O]n the republican view, political participation is not only instrumental in
the ordinary sense; it is also a vehicle for the inculcation of such characteristics as
empathy, virtue, and feelings of community." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1556.
294 See supra notes 56-102 and accompanying text.
295 The continued participation of losers in the republican political battles does
not indicate self-doubt by the political winners, nor does it necessarily indicate that
the winners view the losers' continued disagreement with society's consensus as "a
creative and productive force." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1575. Permitting (or even
requiring) losers to participate in a process that has already rejected their views is a
highly effective means ofcooptation and social control in a republican state. "Alarge
purpose of participation is to monitor the behavior of representatives in order to
limit the risks of factionalism and self-interested representation." Id. at 1556.
Because of his identification with political winners, Sunstein treats the terms
"factionalism and self-interested representation" as self-defining. Of course, all
persistent dissent creates "factionalism," and whether a view is "self-interested"
depends on which part of the public is making the determinations. Winners will see
the matter one way; losers will see it another.
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shift. But to the civic republicans, truth is something much more
than the transitory inclinations of a fickle citizenry. According to
the civic republicans, truth is "universal." 296 This description
suggests that the "truth" discovered during the civic republican
political process is permanent. The civic republican truth is, if not
eternal, then certainly enduring throughout a republican society's
existence.
Civic republican theory appears at first to be quintessentially
democratic because the modern civic republicans feint in the
direction of healthy democratic skepticism before moving decisively
in the opposite direction toward undemocratic political certainty.
The civic republicans repeatedly emphasize that they do not rely on
"ultimate foundations"; 297 that they are not proposing an essentialist doctrine; 298 and that the collective political deliberations they
propose begin with a tabula rasa, on which the political participants
299
can devise any scheme that the society sees fit to endorse.
These are the claims of political skeptics. But having bowed in the
direction of skepticism, civic republicans then proceed to impose
their own set of political certainties. In the place of some religious
or natural law ideal, republican theory gives us the republican
consensus.
Unfortunately, the republican goal of democratic
consensus relies on the same antidemocratic essentialism that the
republicans purportedly renounce.
The culprit here is civic republicanism's first principle: civic
virtue. Recall Sunstein's description of individual preferences in a
pluralist system: "Under the pluralist conception, people come to
the political process with preselected interests that they seek to
promote through political conflict and compromise. Preferences
296 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554 (stating that "[r]epublican thought is
characterized by a belief in universalism").

id. at 1554.
298 Michelman, supra note 4, at 22-24 & n.105 (criticizing and distancing himself
297 See

from the essentialism implicit in "standard or conventional" descriptions of civic
republicanism).
299 This follows from the combination of the civic republican contentions that (1)
republican legislators must leave their private views at the door of the political
process in order to "think from the point of view of everybody," Sunstein, supra note
2, at 1570; and (2) republican governments should consider all private preferences
to be potentially (if not probably) distorted and therefore "object[s] of regulation and
control," Sunstein, supra note 32, at 13. In other words, republican governments are

permitted to remake society as they see fit, with no preconditions and no outside
constraints except those imposed by a category of rights that is "a small one,"
Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1142, if it exists at all.
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are not shaped through governance, but enter into the process as
exogenous variables."3 00 In contrast, Sunstein proposes that the
proper mode of government should involve the government itself
in "instill[ing] principles of virtue." 0 1 To the civic republicans,
values are collective rather than individual in nature. In a republican society, values are taught to individuals by the government and
further reinforced by other parts of the social structure, which will
itself be organized according to the details of collective morality
determined by governmental dialogue and deliberation.
This conception of values seriously misconstrues the practical
limits of collective deliberation in a democratic society. In any
political community, including one organized according to republican principles, individuals will often have strong, deeply felt, and
irreconcilable disagreements about social and personal values.
These disagreements cannot be explained away by implying (as civic
republicans often do) that they are evidence of selfish intransigence
or inadequate socialization. An individual's strong disagreement
about the fundamental values endorsed by much of society does not
mean that the individual's values are corrupt residues of private
interests, or that the individual lacks "civic virtue." It simply means
that the individual's own process of value development leads that
person to a different conclusion than the one reached by the
members of society who-by dent of economic muscle, political
prowess, or sheer strength of numbers-control the government.
Skepticism about claims of "civic virtue" is essential in a
democracy because democratic theory recognizes that all governmental policies are imperfect reflections of the balance of power in
society at the moment. Democratic theory incorporates the
recognition that when society's balance of power shifts, those who
lose power must transfer political legitimacy to society's newly
ascendant forces. Civic republican theory attempts to circumvent
this natural transfer of power by allowing a momentarily ascendant
group to ascribe "universal" status to their values and use the
governmental apparatus to perpetuate these values. Thus, by
denying the losers' principle of skepticism, the civic republicans also
deny the popular consent on which all democratic systems must
rely.

300 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.
301 Id.
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B. The Impermanence of Power and the Inevitability of Conflict
As their heavy emphasis on consensus indicates, civic republicans detest the political conflict that skepticism about values
engenders. If there is no absolute truth, people are invited to
devise their own individual truths and to fight for their adoption by
the government. The entire civic republican system is oriented
toward finding a way to overcome the unceasing political conflict
borne of skepticism and replace it with reconciliation and agreement about universal truths. The civic republican aversion to
conflict violates the second losers' principle of democracy, which I
will call the principle of impermanent power. This principle states
that all democratic rulers hold power temporarily, are always subject
to opposition, and must concede power when popular consent to
their rule disappears.
One consequence of this principle is that the policies of a
democratic state will occasionally change, sometimes radically.
Political stasis is anathema to a democracy. Another consequence
is that conflict for power and the right to control policy is inevitable
and constant. A final consequence is that democratic theory
imposes limitations on the extent to which a regime may use its
temporary authority to instill support for itself among citizens. Like
all other losers' principles, the principle of impermanent power and
its consequences are logically required by the central democratic
axiom of popular consent. The mandate of popular consent
demands that no ruler may supplant the vox populi by perpetuating
his or her own rule indefinitely.
As discussed in the previous sections, the civic republican focus
on consensus and the "substantively correct" values incorporated in
civic virtue is diametrically opposed to the principle of impermanent power. At times, civic republicans concede that their hostility
toward conflict and their quest for a stable and lasting consensus
30 2
may not be altogether realistic in a modern, complex society.
But they contradict this recognition when they argue that political
decisions may be invalid if evidence indicates that the decisions are
nothing more than the product of political conflict and compromise.a03 Even if it is unrealistic in the modern world, the civic
302 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1555 ("It would be fanciful to suggest that
different conceptions of the good life can or should always be mediated through
politics.").
303 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM.
L. REV. 1689 (1984) (arguing that the Constitution prohibits decisions based on
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republicans cannot abandon their quest for consensus and their
aversion to persistent political conflict. This aversion reflects their
belief that society collectively can resolve through dialogue many
essential questions about political, social, moral, and personal
values. If they abandon this belief, nothing significant will remain
of civic republican theory.
The problem with the civic republican proposal to resolve
essential conflicts through dialogue is that the resolution eliminates
the very thing-the harshly contrasting viewpoints-that makes the
dialogue productive. Consensus requires conformity. The civic
republicans recognize and lament this fact, but they cannot help
trying to have their cake and eat it too. They seek the advantages
of living in a pluralistic society, but they do not want a society
governed by pluralism. Their theory ultimately fails because they
have not devised a credible answer to the claim that one leads to the
other. Professor Michelman notes that "nothing could be further
from the aim and spirit of this essay [advocating civic republican
theory] than to question the value of pluralism" when defined as
30 4
"the acceptance and celebration of diversity within a society."
In contrast, Michelman criticizes and disavows the version of
pluralism that "doubts or denies our ability to communicate such
material in ways that move each other's views on disputed normative
issues towards felt (not merely strategic) agreement without
deception, coercion, or other manipulation."3 0 5 "Bad" pluralism,
in Michelman's view, asserts that "good politics does not essentially
involve the direction of reason and argument towards any common,
ideal, or self-transcendent end."3 0 6 Like all civic republicans,
Michelman views "good" politics as the merging of individual
differences into a common ideal. However, it is unclear how society
can enjoy true diversity if everyone in society seeks ultimately to
agree about all or most important values. Civic republicans seem
willing to accept diversity only regarding things that do not matter
much. The diversity republicans seek is a comforting, benign, and
nonthreatening diversity. They seek a sort of safe, suburban
diversity, which is to say, no real diversity at all.
"naked preferences'"-the distribution of resources based on the interests of those in
power rather than the public good).
'0 Michelman, supra note 2, at 1507.
305 Id.

306

Id. at 1508.
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In a society composed of many different types of people, with
many different backgrounds, faction is inevitable. By "faction" I
mean simply competition and disagreement among individuals and
groups with different values and views of life. Faction poses a
danger only to those who fear the messiness and uncertainty that
characterizes any true democracy. Those who fear the dangers of
faction usually are those who believe that they (or people who share
their values) will be able to control-for the long term-the dialogue
and its results. They have the winners' perspective; their fear of
faction flows largely from the fear that their victory in the collective
deliberations of a republican state will be undercut by those who
lose in the deliberations and, instead of capitulating to the terms set
by the victor's notion of "civic virtue," insist on mustering their
forces to fight another day.
It is understandable that this constant bickering, disagreement,
and threat of policy reversal will upset those who win a particular
battle at a particular time. It is also understandable that the victors
will want to certify their political victory as something beyond
politics-i.e., as "virtue" itself. But what the victors consider to be
their opponents' bad manners or bad citizenship is in fact an
absolutely essential characteristic of a healthy democracy. The
principle of impermanent power dictates that democracy cannot
survive without constant dissidence and concerted opposition to
those presently holding power. Ossified power is by definition
undemocratic, and the only thing that prevents power from
ossifying is vociferous opposition.
Moreover, the dissidence necessary to democracy must go
beyond the pale, "op-ed" dissidence that the civic republicans seem
willing to tolerate. Democracy requires governments to give sway
to unruly and disruptive dissidents, as well as nice, well-dressed,
congenial dissidents who express their willingness to concede defeat
and join hands with their former adversaries.
Fundamental,
continual, and uncompromising dissidence must be permitted with
regard to every value and policy that is important to society,
including the most treasured and cherished values that make up the
republicans' beloved civic virtue. Any lesser protection for the
expression of outri political values entrenches the status quo and
perpetuates power in an antidemocratic manner.
The principle of impermanent power also requires that
dissidents be allowed to congregate, press their disagreements with
the status quo, and urge others to buck the system. They may not
have their contrary beliefs demonized as antisocial or distorted and
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thereby subjected to control by the government. Nor may a
democratic government engage in systematic efforts to re-educate
its citizens in the "correct" way of thinking about the world. The
principle of impermanent power is fundamentally incompatible with
Sunstein's notion that "[e]ducation and prevailing morality ...
provide the principal lines of defense against the dangers of
30 7
faction."
One of the odd things about modern civic republican theory is
that it is advanced largely by theorists on the political left. This is
odd because the theory has a number of elitist and paternalist
overtones. Indeed, the overall thrust of civic republicanism owes
more to the conservative communitarianism of Edmund Burke than
to any one other theorist.3°8 Like Burke, the civic republicans
distrust the individual's ability to govern his or her own actions
without the intervention and constant guidance of the enlightened
portion of society. The civic republican view that the community
should regulate and, if possible, change individuals' "distorted," prepolitical, private preferences3 0 9 indicates that republicans essentially concur with Burke's famous dictum that the individual is
foolish but the species is wise.3 10 Burke, however, took this
dictum and made it the centerpiece of a conservative theory of
government, in which the status quo was revered and any shift in
the hierarchy of power was disfavored. 1
307 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.

At least one civic republican proponent recognizes this affinity. See TUSHNET,
supra note 2, at 177-78.
309 See supra notes 56-102 and accompanying text.
310 Like the civic republicans, Burke argued that government should notbe based
on "blind, unmeaning prejudices. For a man is a most unwise and a most wise being.
The individual is foolish; the multitude ... is foolish, when they act without
deliberation; but the species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species, it
almost always acts right." EDMUND BURKE, BURKE'S PoLITrcs 227 (RossJ.S. Hoffman
& Paul Levack eds., 1949). In this passage, Burke also makes a very civic republicanlike distinction between the unreflective "multitude" and the wise "species" whose
actions and perceptions of reality are guided by enlightened political facilitators
pursuing the public interest. Burke's distinction mirrors the contrast civic republicans
308

draw between the "corrupt" pluralist system of government controlled by groups

seeking to further their own self-interest and the "virtuous" republican system of
government organized according to the principles of civic virtue. See e.g., Sunstein,

supra note 4, at 31-35 (discussing the differences between these two conceptions of
politics and their views on the problem of factions).
311 And of course, radical shifts in power such as that proposed by the French
Revolution were the most highly disfavored of all. See generally EDMUND BURKE,
REFLEaTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 39.45 (Thomas H.D. Mahoney ed.,
1955) (criticizing the French, in part, for breaking violently from their political system
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In the Burkean system, the foolish and distrusted hoi polloi was
to be controlled in much the same way as the unruly masses
pursuing their distorted preferences in the modern civic republican
state: the government would cultivate the virtuous habits and ways
of thinking that would in turn produce reliable subjects who did not
threaten the governing status quo.3 12 The Burkean system, like
the civic republican system, was therefore hostile to the principle of
impermanent government. To Burke's way of thinking, good
government depended on permanent power arrangements and
custodial politics31 3 because only through the accretion of generations of political expertise could individuals escape their foolishness
3 14
and witness the wisdom of the species.
The Burkean conservative tradition lives on in the guise of
"progressive" modern civic republican theory. This is evident in
Sunstein's discussion of Madison's views on public-spirited representation, which Sunstein cites as one model for the modern theory of
republican government. 315 Sunstein admires in Madison's work
the very Burkean notion that representatives would be insulated
rather than building on that system to improve the future).
312 In Burke's England, this function was carried out by the system of ecclesiastical
education. See BURKE, supra note 310, at 313-17. Note also Burke's attack on the
corrosive effects of "progressive" French educational systems that do not teach
respect for authority and tradition. See id. at 384-86. Burke's objective was the same
as that of the civic republicans: "to instill principles of virtue in the hope of ensuring
that the spirit of faction will not develop." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.
313 This concept implies governance by representatives who are independent from
those who are subject to their rule, and base their political actions on their own
considered notions of the general good, rather than their constituents' unreflective
immediate desires. See BURKE, supranote 310, at 114-17; FRANK O'GORMAN, EDMUND
BURKE: His POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 54-56 (1973). Again, Sunstein expresses similar
sentiments, arguing in favor of "structural mechanisms [that] would insulate
representatives, to a greater or lesser degree, from constituent pressures, in the hope
that they will deliberate more effectively on the public good." Sunstein, supra note
4, at 34.
Thus, both Burke and the civic republicans seek to put distance between the
rulers and the ruled. This notion befits Burke's reverence for tradition and his
support for a hereditary monarchy and a landed aristocracy. However, this is an
ironic objective in the civic republican system, which supposedly is premised on the
goal of democratic self-governance. Ironic or not, the goal of distancing the rulers
from the ruled is unavoidable in the civic republican system, because it is a necessary
consequence of the republican insistence that government seek to further the
common good rather than simply to reflect the distorted pre-political views of their
constituents. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 45-46, 81-85; see also Michelman, supra
note 4, at 50-55 (discussing the Burkean theory of "virtual representation").
314 See BURKE, supra note 311, at 37-39.
315 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1558-60; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 38-49, 68-85.
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from popular pressure, which would allow them to rise above
political conflict and act according to their view of the broader
public interest.3 16 In admiring these lofty sentiments, however,
Sunstein-the progressive-ignores both Madison's rhetorical
caginess and his very specific perspective on the particular components of the public interest. Madison's appealing assertions about
"public values" in politics cannot be distinguished from his very
conservative fears regarding the threat posed by the impoverished
masses,3 1 7 his nonegalitarian views on the linkage between the
"diversity in the faculties of men" and property rights, 3 18 and his
belief that the new republic should take care "to protect the
319
minority of the opulent against the majority."
Like every politician, Madison simply recast his own private
interest as the public interest.3 20 This does not mean that Madison's contributions to constitutional theory are not worthwhile, or
that the structure of government he helped to create is irrevocably
flawed. It simply means that, like the civic republicans, Madison
viewed the world like a political winner. Like the civic republicans,
Madison tended to overstate the value of consensus and stability,
and diminish the value of dissent, conflict, and opposition. Like
Burke, Madison accurately perceived the ideological coloration of
his theories. It is the progressive civic republicans who have it
wrong.

316 Madisonian representation would "refine and enlarge the public views by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may
best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love ofjustice

will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in

Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1559.
317 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 203-04 (Max

Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS].
318 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
319 1 RECORDS, supra note 316, at 431.
320 Of course, this is not an original observation. It is also a focal point of Charles

Beard's famous study of the Constitution's framing. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 152-88

(1935) (arguing that the Constitution, as primarily an economic document, served to
protect the substantial property interests of the Framers, including Madison).
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C. Individual Autonomy

The final losers' principle that the civic republicans deny is the
principle of individual autonomy. I am speaking here primarily of
moral autonomy in the realm of social and personal values. That is,

the autonomy to formulate values independent of government
control, and even to act on those values in situations where other

individuals are not hampered in formulating their own values. This
notion of autonomy is in direct contrast to the civic republican
assertion that private preferences are properly the subject of direct
321
government regulation and control.
Like the other losers' principles, the principle of personal
autonomy is derived directly from the democratic requirement of
popular consent. Put simply, if individual moral autonomy is not
protected from government control, popular consent is a meaningless concept. The notion of popular consent assumes that those
giving consent are, in significant ways, independent of the government to which they are giving (or refusing to give) their consent.
A government that can use its coercive power to inculcate favorable
sentiments among its citizens effectively dictates their consent. This
is a virtually pure form of Sunstein's own concept of "coercion
understood as consent." 3 22
If the democratic requirement of
popular consent means anything, it cannot countenance situations
in which citizens simply give back to the government the opinions
and approval that the government has instructed them it wants to
hear.
Of course, Sunstein does not apply his notion of "coercion
understood as consent" to governmental direction of individual
values. In fact, he uses the concept to justify this form of political
action.3 23
Sunstein uses the phrase "coercion understood as
consent" to cast doubt on the preferences formed by individuals in
response to the informal and uncoordinated influence of society at
large, but he seems unwilling to apply it to the much more
concerted, intrusive, direct, and potentially effective coercion
imposed by government edict.
I have already noted the empirical problems with Sunstein's
refusal to apply this notion to government. 324 I am concerned

321

text.

See Sunstein,supranote 32, at 13;seealsosupranotes 56-102 and accompanying

322
2

Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1157.

324

Foremost among these problems is the fact that whatever distortions exist in

3 3 Id. at 1154-57.
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here with a different problem: the political effect of civic republican government intervention in individual value formulation. The
civic republican system is premised on the notion that some private
preferences are substantively incorrect, and that one of government's central functions is to eradicate these preferences, in the
process producing a better brand of citizen. However, it is
impossible for government to "regulate and control" a citizen's
private preferences without also "regulating and controlling" the
citizen's views about his or her political role. In a system where the
government is given virtually free reign to control antisocial
impulses and preferences, the individual will inevitably internalize
the civic republican view of the world-the state always knows best.
Disagreeing with collective determinations about improper
preferences will not lead to the common democratic response (i.e.,
get involved and try to change the system), but rather to a sense of
ostracism and exclusion.
It is no answer to say that a civic republican system permits
individuals with improper private preferences to attempt through
dialogue and persuasion to change the system. If the initial
collective determination about the dissident citizen's private
preferences is correct, as Sunstein assumes,- 25 then the system
should not change, and it would be a waste of society's resources to
let the dissident try to change it. On the other hand, if the initial
collective determination about the dissident's private preferences is
incorrect, then the civic republican system is flawed to begin with,
and a system capable of making such an egregious misjudgment
should never be given the authority to regulate and control private
preferences in the first place. Moreover, under an efficient civic
republican system, we will never know whether or not the system's
determination about the dissident's private preferences is right or
wrong. This is true because the system's power to dictate private
preferences will eliminate the possibility of dissidence by "instill[ing]
principles of virtue" 26 and using "[e]ducation and prevailing
morality" 2 7 to reinforce society's approved values among the
citizenry.
the private sector will also exist, perhaps to an even greater extent, in the government. See supra notes 144-80 and accompanying text.
25 This assumption is based on the ground that a properly constructed civic
republican political system "is designed to produce substantively correct outcomes."
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1554.
326 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.
327 id.
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I should once again emphasize that the civic republicans
themselves sometimes express doubts about the broad powers they
provide to the government. As Sunstein says, "there are serious
risks of overreaching here."3 28 Yet the civic republican response
to these risks is inadequate, where it exists at all. There are, in fact,
only two possible responses to the risks of government overreaching: either limit the power of government and therefore prevent in
advance tyrannical excesses in the name of "virtue," or do not limit
the power of government and hope for the best. As I have already
explained, the civic republicans essentially refuse to rely on the first
response,3 29 and are therefore left with some variation on Michelman's willingness "to take an occasional chance" that those with
33 0
political power will do the right thing.
For all the emphasis on dialogue, consensus, and self-governance, the fact is that the civic republicans are really quite uncomfortable with democracy. In the end, they trust the government
more than the people who make up the government. A government
that has as its primary objective the control of its citizens' private
preferences is no longer a democratic regime. Of course, every
government will influence its citizens' values whenever the government makes a policy decision that favors some conduct and
disfavors other conduct. In the ordinary democratic scheme of
things, however, the government must leave open avenues for
opposition. Democratic governments acknowledge from the outset
that their policies may be wrong. The modern "progressive"
variants of civic republicanism create a system in which a select
group of knowing and public-spirited political leaders will instruct
a flawed and misguided citizenry to recognize some version of
eternal political truth. The theory is elitist to the core, and is
therefore incompatible not only with democracy, but with traditional progressive political inclinations as well. It is an odd form of
leftism that considers "the people" a group to be led, rather than
followed.
The civic republicans fail to create a blueprint for a more
humane democratic political system because they begin with an
invalid premise about the nature of human beings in society. Civic
republicans are correct in asserting that "the community is a
community of individuals, whose own identities are inseparable
328 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 13.

329 See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying text.
330 See Michelman, supra note 230, at 316-19.
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But although individual
from their social involvements." 33 1
identities "are inseparable from their social involvements," they are
not indistinguishable from those involvements. The individual
living within society will always be, as the civic republicans repeatedly claim, "socially constructed." But the individual also will always
be separate-physically, mentally, and morally--from the collective
entities within which the individual operates. It is an undeniable
existential fact that an individual will never be the society in which
he or she lives. This existential separateness is experienced every
day by even the most well-socialized and unselfish person. Unless
we adopt a theory of the state as the manifestation of a universal
collective consciousness into which all citizens are absorbed,332
individual autonomy will remain a fact with which every government
must deal. Democracy demands that governments respect this
Any attempt to override it
ineluctable individual autonomy.
through the collective inculcation of "civic virtue" is totalitarianism,
even if the totalitarianism has a human face.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the civic republicans get it wrong because they agree
with Plato that politics is the "art whose business it is to care for
souls." 333 The civic republican view of the world transforms
politics into a potentially more sinister affair than it is in schemes
that view politics as the more mundane business of ascertaining who
gets what, when, and how.3 34 The republican view also increases
the importance of politicians, which is just another term for the
actively self-governing citizens who populate the corridors of power
in the civic republican world. Unfortunately, centuries of experience tell us that politicians who seek to save souls are dangerous
animals. They too often tend to find in their own souls a model for
all humankind.
The theme of this article is that civic republicans give government virtually unlimited power, and therefore fail to check the
tendency of absolute power to corrupt absolutely. But perhaps an
even more telling flaw in the republican system is its failure to
account for the psychology of power. By granting their citizen331 Michelman, supra note 4, at 32.
332 See GEORG W. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 155-223 (T.M. Knox

trans., 1942).
333 See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 3 (citation omitted).
334 See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How 3 (1950).
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politicians the ultimate power to recast souls, the civic republicans
ignore Kenneth Tynan's axiom that "power is delightful, and
absolute power is absolutely delightful."-3 5 It is great fun to
recreate the world in one's own image, and the entertainment does
not cease until the reproduction is identical to the original.
Maybe this cynical attitude toward power does not fit the decent
and humane aspirations of the civic republican system. Maybe the
proposed civic republican government would be able to restrain
itself in the interest of the common good. Maybe a modern civic
republican regime would avoid the free exercise of its authority to
prevent individuals from developing "bad" preferences and desires.
But then again, maybe not. Human beings are a diverse bunch of
idiosyncratic, obstinate, and even ornery creatures. Democracy is
the one political system that attempts to take into account these
characteristics of human nature by giving every person the right to
be wrong. Along with Plato, the civic republicans are willing to
sacrifice this right in the interest of collectively saving a few souls.
Personally, I am willing to sacrifice a little civic virtue for the sake
of retaining control over my own soul. Like most other souls I have
encountered, mine probably has too many rough edges to be worth
saving, anyway.

-35Although my memory firmly attributes this quote to the British theater critic
Kenneth Tynan, I have been unable to locate the original source. For Tynan's general
ruminations on this and other subjects, see generally KENNETH TYNAN, HE THAT
PLAYs THE KING: A VIEW OF THE THEATRE (1950); KENNETH TYNAN, TYNAN RIGHT

AND LEFT: PLAYs, FILMS, PEOPLE, PLACES AND EvENTs (1967).

